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The United States needs a Defender General—a public oﬃcial charged with
representing the collective interests of criminal defendants before the Supreme Court
of the United States. The Supreme Court is eﬀectively our nation’s chief regulator of
criminal justice. But in the battle to influence the Court’s rulemaking, government
interests have substantial structural advantages. As compared to counsel for
defendants, government lawyers—and particularly those from the U.S. Solicitor
General’s Oﬃce—tend to be more experienced advocates who have more credibility
with the Court. Most importantly, government lawyers can act strategically to play
for bigger long-term victories, while defense lawyers must zealously advocate for the
interests of their clients—even when they conflict with the collective interests of
defendants. The prosecution’s advantages likely distort the law on the margins.
If designed carefully, staﬀed with the right personnel, and given time to develop
institutional credibility, a new Oﬃce of the Defender General could level the playing
field, making the Court a more effective regulator of criminal justice. In some cases—
where the interests of a particular defendant and those of defendants as a class
align—the Defender General would appear as counsel for a defendant. In cases where
the defendant’s interests diverge from the collective interests of defendants, the
Defender General might urge the Court not to grant certiorari, or it might even argue
against the defendant’s position on the merits. In all cases, the Defender General
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would take the broad view, strategically seeking to move the doctrine in defendantfriendly directions and counteracting the government’s structural advantages.
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INTRODUCTION
Among its many other roles, the Supreme Court of the United States
serves as a preeminent regulator of the nation’s criminal justice system.
Through the process of constitutional adjudication, the Justices develop rules
that govern criminal justice actors at all stages of the criminal process, from
police oﬃcers to prison guards and everyone in between. Observers often
defend the Court’s aggressive role in criminal justice as a corrective to a
political process that badly discounts the interests of criminal suspects and
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defendants.1 Yet many fail to acknowledge that the Supreme Court is itself a
forum in which defendants are at a signiﬁcant structural disadvantage.
Quite simply, criminal litigation in the Supreme Court is not played on a
level playing ﬁeld. Rather, in the contest to inﬂuence the Court’s criminal
justice policymaking, the government has three weighty advantages. First, and
most importantly, prosecutors can “play for the rules.” They can advocate for
the long-term objectives of the government as a unitary interest, even when
that means sacriﬁcing a particular conviction. Criminal defense lawyers, by
contrast, must zealously defend the interests of their particular clients. They
must play for the case, even to the point of making arguments that are
contrary to the interests of criminal defendants collectively. Second, there is
often a stark contrast in the quality of representation in criminal cases at the
Court. While the prosecution is typically represented by experienced lawyers
working within formal institutional structures designed to maximize
Supreme Court expertise and inﬂuence, defendants often have lawyers with
little or no Supreme Court experience. Two sitting Justices have publicly
decried the problem,2 and scholarly analyses support their assessments.3
Third, government lawyers—especially lawyers from the Office of the Solicitor
General in the Department of Justice—are repeat players before the Court.
Beyond expertise, those frequent appearances give the Oﬃce credibility in
1 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 173 (1980) (explaining the need for a “nonpolitical check on excessive severity” in the
death penalty context); see also Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory
of Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1093 (1993) (noting that the electorate “overwhelming[ly]” favors police
and prosecutorial powers).
2 See Melissa Harris, Justice Elena Kagan Gives an Inside Look at the U.S. Supreme Court, CHI.
TRIB. (Feb. 3, 2015, 4:05 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-conﬁdential-elenakagan-0204-biz-20150203-column.html [https://perma.cc/AL3R-DSV7] (“‘I think that the litigants
who are underserved in terms of lawyering quality are criminal defendants,’ [Justice] Kagan said.”);
Janet Miller, Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan Tells U-M Crowd About Serious and Not-So-Serious
Workings of the High Court, ANN ARBOR NEWS (Sept. 7, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://www.annarbor.com/
news/supreme-court-justice-elena-kagan-discusses-the-serious-and-not-so-serious-workingsof-the-high-cour [https://perma.cc/QAX5-WLT5] (quoting Justice Kagan as saying, “Often,
[criminal defense attorneys] are appearing before the Supreme Court for the ﬁrst time. I hope that
changes in the future” (quotation marks omitted)); Janet Roberts, Joan Biskupic & John Shiﬀman,
Special Report: In Ever-Clubbier Bar, Eight Men Emerge as Supreme Court Confidants, REUTERS (Dec.
8, 2014, 5:57 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-scotus-advocates-specialreport-idUSKBN0J
M11E20141208 [https://perma.cc/N84B-ZE3Y] (“Said Justice Sonia Sotomayor: ‘I think it’s malpractice
for any lawyer who thinks this is my one shot before the Supreme Court and I have to take it.’”).
3 See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Regaining Perspective: Constitutional Criminal Adjudication in the
U.S. Supreme Court, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1985, 1988 (2016) (characterizing the Supreme Court
criminal defense bar as “uniquely inexpert”); William C. Kinder, Note, Putting Justice Kagan’s
“Hobbyhorse” Through Its Paces: An Examination of the Criminal Defense Advocacy Gap at the U.S.
Supreme Court, 103 GEO. L.J. 227, 236 (2014) (“[T]he criminal defense experience deﬁcit jeopardizes
both the outcomes for individual defendants and the shape of civil liberties nationwide.”).
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the eyes of the Justices. Credibility is a valuable currency in all litigation,
including criminal litigation in the Supreme Court.
Taken together, these advantages put a thumb on the scales in Supreme
Court criminal litigation. Of course, that does not mean that defense interests
lose in every case. Far from it: criminal defendants regularly win signiﬁcant
victories at the High Court, including several just in October Term 2018.4
But the representational asymmetries likely distort the Court’s decisionmaking
over time, at least at the margins, making criminal justice policy friendlier to
the government than it might otherwise be. As a result, the Supreme Court
is a ﬂawed regulator of criminal justice.
This Article oﬀers a solution to this problem. We propose, theorize, and
defend an Oﬃce of the Defender General that would be charged with
advocating for the interests of criminal defendants as a class before the
Supreme Court. If designed appropriately, staﬀed with the right personnel,
and given time to develop institutional credibility, such an oﬃce could
signiﬁcantly level the playing ﬁeld. Creating a Defender General would be a
relatively straightforward and low-cost reform that would generate signiﬁcant
beneﬁts for the entire criminal justice system.
The Article develops that argument in three parts. Part I explains the
problems with the Court’s status quo decisionmaking process in criminal
cases. Section I.A begins by situating the Court’s role in criminal justice
policymaking. It explains that because other institutions lack the willingness
or ability to closely supervise the criminal justice system, the Court acts as a
de facto regulator through case-by-case adjudication. Section I.B then fully
describes the three asymmetries noted above—quality of advocacy, lawyer
credibility, and, most critically, the government’s “uniﬁed vision,” which
permits it to play the long game before the Court. Section I.B also oﬀers
examples of how these asymmetries inﬂuence the development of legal
doctrine, at least at the margins. Lastly, Section I.C discusses previous
attempts to deal with the problem of asymmetrical Supreme Court
representation in criminal cases. We pay particular attention to two—
legislation oﬀered by Senator Cory Booker in 2016,5 and a proposal by
Professor Andrew Crespo.6 While both would remediate some of the
disparities in Supreme Court criminal litigation, neither tackles them all.
We lay out our proposal in Part II. Section II.A describes the projected
operations of the Oﬃce of the Defender General. We envision that the
Defender General would participate in Supreme Court criminal litigation at
4 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019); Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228
(2019); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
5 See Clarence Gideon Full Access to Justice Act, S. 3145, 114th Cong. (2016).
6 See Crespo, supra note 3, at 2026-30.
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both the certiorari and the merits stages. In cases where the interests of a
particular defendant were aligned with the interests of defendants collectively,
the Defender General could serve as defense counsel or (where a defendant
has a lawyer he wants to keep) as amicus curiae in support of the defendant.
But in other cases, where the interests diverged, the Defender General might
decline to participate, argue that the Court should deny certiorari in a
particular case, or even ﬁle a merits brief arguing against the positions taken
by a particular defendant. But whether the Defender General argued for or
against the defendant in a particular case, her involvement would ameliorate
the asymmetries endemic in Supreme Court criminal litigation today. That’s
because the interests of defendants collectively would be represented by a team
of experienced, credible attorneys thinking about how to move doctrine in
defendant-friendly directions over the long run of cases.
Section II.B goes on to consider how the Oﬃce would be designed. The
most pressing questions involve who would serve as the head of the Oﬃce—
the Defender General herself—and how that person would be selected. Our
hope is that the Oﬃce would, by virtue of its role in Supreme Court
litigation, bear considerable prestige, and thus be an attractive position for
both experienced criminal defense attorneys and talented Supreme Court
litigators. The “who selects” question is more complicated. We propose that
the Defender General be selected by—and accountable to—a board whose
members represent various constituencies within the criminal defense
community. Section II.B also brieﬂy considers questions about the design of
the Oﬃce and its staﬃng more generally.
Section II.C responds to likely objections. It ﬁrst engages with the
objection that existing institutions either do or could fulﬁll the mission that
we envision for the Defender General. While existing institutions do valuable
work in advocating on behalf of criminal defendants in the Supreme Court,
none can counteract the government’s advantages as eﬀectively as a Defender
General would. Next, Section II.C entertains the objection that the collective
interests of defendants would be impossible for the Defender General to
identify. While we acknowledge that ascertaining the collective interests of
heterogeneous defendants would, in some cases, involve diﬃcult tradeoﬀs, we
believe that a Defender General would be able to meet the challenge. Finally,
Section II.C considers—and ultimately adopts as a friendly amendment—the
objection that our proposal would, if adopted, lead to a proliferation of
Supreme Court “Generals” for various corners of the law.
Part III considers possible extensions of the proposal, as well as some
additional implications. In Section III.A, we imagine how the proposal might
work in a world with radically diﬀerent ethical rules. What if the Defender
General were the exclusive Supreme Court lawyer for criminal defendants,
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with the power to concede a case against a defendant’s wishes? The Solicitor
General possesses that authority in almost all litigation in which the United
States is a party. We ultimately conclude that such a regime would be
normatively unacceptable in the defense context, but examining the
possibility helps draw into focus the problem of asymmetrical ethical rules in
criminal litigation. In Section III.B, we brieﬂy consider various possibilities
for how the Defender General’s Oﬃce could be involved in the criminal
process beyond the Supreme Court—in lower appellate courts, trial courts,
and state courts. These possibilities present various diﬃculties and tradeoﬀs.
Finally, Part III.C considers potential alternatives to the proposal we have
identiﬁed. Our proposal represents a kind of “leveling up,” giving criminal
defendants as a class the beneﬁts enjoyed by the government. But an
alternative would be a form of leveling down: what if the government were
required to litigate cases more like individual criminal defendants? As one
way to implement that vision, we imagine shifting choices about Supreme
Court litigation from the Solicitor General’s Oﬃce to line-level federal
prosecutors. We ultimately reject that proposal for several reasons, but
considering it helps bring the problem we are trying to solve into starker
relief. We also brieﬂy consider regulatory alternatives other than courts: if it
isn’t possible to truly level the playing ﬁeld in the judicial arena, does that
suggest that the Supreme Court is not the right regulatory institution in
criminal justice? Perhaps, but here we think it is critical to do a comparative
institutional analysis. And it is far from clear that any alternative regulator
would not have its own distorting asymmetries, given the fundamental
diﬀerences between the kinds of interests on competing sides of the battle to
shape the rules in criminal justice.
I. THE PROBLEM
This Part lays out the problem that our proposal seeks to solve. Section
I.A describes the Supreme Court’s preeminent role in regulating the
American criminal justice system. Section I.B then explains the three
representational asymmetries that distort the Court’s decisionmaking in
criminal cases. Section I.C brieﬂy reviews previous proposals to improve the
representation of criminal defendants at the Supreme Court.
A. The Supreme Court as Criminal Justice Regulator
The Supreme Court plays a number of roles in the American legal system.
It gets the most attention, of course, when it decides important matters of
constitutional law. The nation often asks the Court to find “answers” to its
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most divisive questions—aﬃrmative action,7 gay marriage,8 abortion,9 to
name a few—in the Constitution. Often, the Court is willing to take up
that invitation.10
Yet much of what the Court does every year never appears in a newspaper
headline. While in any given Term the Court will decide a handful of highproﬁle cases dealing with grand questions of constitutional law, the bulk of
its cases are more quotidian. Consider the Court’s work in October Term
2018. While a few big-ticket constitutional cases like American Legion v.
American Humanist Ass’n11 and Rucho v. Common Cause12 got most of the
attention, the Court decided plenty of cases like Nutraceutical Corp. v.
Lambert,13 which concerned the deadline to seek permission to ﬁle an
interlocutory appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), or Rimini
Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc.,14 which addressed the meaning of the term
“full costs” in the Copyright Act’s fee-shifting provision. Such cases do not
engage the public’s imagination like American Legion and Rucho do, but they
are an important part of the Court’s work. For in addition to being the
tribunal charged with resolving the country’s deepest constitutional
conundrums, the Court is also the venue we entrust to resolve less exciting
questions of federal law that have divided or confused the lower courts.15
But the Supreme Court has yet another role that might be its most
signiﬁcant. The Court is, perhaps more than anything else, a criminal court.
Criminal cases constitute roughly a third of the Court’s merits docket in a
typical Term.16 October Term 2018 was no exception, with criminal cases making
7 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 302-03 (2013) (reviewing the
constitutionality of a race-conscious admissions program).
8 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015) (reviewing the constitutionality
of state laws denying full recognition to same-sex marriages).
9 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844-46 (1992) (reviewing the
constitutionality of laws burdening abortion access); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973) (same).
10 It’s in these highest-proﬁle cases that Eugene Rostow’s description of the Justices as
“teachers in a vital national seminar” seems most ﬁtting. Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character
of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 208 (1952). For a somewhat critical appraisal of this vision
of Supreme Court Justices as teachers for the country, see Daniel Epps, Teacher for the Nation, 70
HASTINGS L.J. 1207, 1209-10 (2019).
11 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
12 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
13 139 S. Ct. 710, 713 (2019).
14 139 S. Ct. 873, 876 (2019).
15 See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (2008) (discussing the
Court’s emphasis on resolving circuit splits and ensuring uniformity of the law).
16 In October Term 2017, the Court decided sixteen criminal cases and seven federal habeas
corpus cases out of seventy-one merits cases (32.4%). The Supreme Court, 2017 Term—The Statistics,
132 HARV. L. REV. 447, 460-61 (2018). The prior Term, the Court decided seventeen criminal cases
and ﬁve federal habeas cases out of sixty-nine merits cases (31.9%). The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—
The Statistics, 131 HARV. L. REV. 403, 414-16 (2017). Although we are counting habeas cases, these
statistics do not include other civil cases which may touch on criminal justice such as civil actions
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up a large chunk (23.6%) of the docket.17 The Court also routinely decides a
number of what we might call “criminal-adjacent” civil cases—cases involving
civil-rights causes of action, such as Bivens18 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983—that have
meaningful consequences for policing and other aspects of law enforcement.19
Considering only the merits docket, moreover, understates the role
criminal justice plays at the Court. Criminal cases claim an even larger share
of the Court’s certiorari docket.20 Also, a signiﬁcant portion of the Court’s
“shadow docket”—the opinions and orders that the Court issues outside of
the normal process for brieﬁng and oral argument21—involve criminal or
criminal-adjacent matters.22 A striking number of the Court’s summary
reversals in recent years have involved criminal or habeas cases, as well as civil
cases dealing with the question of qualiﬁed immunity for law enforcement
oﬃcers.23 And much of the Court’s orders docket involves criminal justice, as
the Court expends signiﬁcant resources dealing with last-minute requests for
stays of execution in capital cases.24
Through its work in criminal and criminal-adjacent cases, the Supreme
Court exerts a powerful influence over the country’s criminal justice system—
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens. For a fuller elaboration of what counts as a “criminal case”
for purposes of this Article, see infra note 204 and accompanying text.
17 The Supreme Court, 2018 Term—The Statistics, 133 HARV. L. REV. 412, 426-27 (2019).
18 See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
19 In October Term 2018, for example, the Court decided Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 172021 (2019), which dealt with the standard for First Amendment retaliatory-arrest suits against police
officers; City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 501 (2019) (per curiam), which addressed whether
two police oﬃcers were entitled to qualiﬁed immunity from a suit alleging excessive force; and
McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2153 (2019), which concerned the statute of limitations for
fabricated-evidence claims brought against a prosecutor.
20 For example, between October 1, 2009, and September 30, 2010, 5910 certiorari petitions
were ﬁled, of which 2449 (41.4%) were from criminal cases. See UNIV. AT ALBANY, HINDELANG
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH CTR., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE
tbl.5.70.2010, https://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5702010.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2A4-7EK9]
(last visited Mar. 25, 2020).
21 William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 1, 5 (2015).
22 See id. at 41-45 (listing summary reversals in the Roberts Court through July 2014, of which
forty-one out of ﬁfty-seven (71.9%) involved criminal or habeas cases, and of which an additional six
(10.5%) involved § 1983 cases).
23 For discussion of the Court’s use of summary reversals in criminal cases, see id. at 30-36, 39,
and Robert M. Yablon, Justice Sotomayor and the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Process, YALE L.J. FORUM
551, 561-62 (2014). On summary reversals involving qualiﬁed immunity, see William Baude, Is
Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 85-87 (2018).
24 See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF
THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 119-29 (1998) (describing the ﬂurry of
activity within the Court when last-minute motions are ﬁled in capital cases). Indeed, such ﬁlings
are so frequent that “the Clerk of the Supreme Court keeps track of scheduled executions around
the country and distributes the list to the Justices every week.” STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL.,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 924-25 (10th ed. 2013).
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or, perhaps, more accurately, our nation’s criminal justice systems. Some of
the Court’s cases—such as those involving the interpretation of federal
statutes—aﬀect only federal criminal justice, which itself is a fairly small slice
of American criminal justice.25 But decisions that involve the constitutional
rules governing criminal investigations, plea bargains, and trials apply to all
the criminal justice systems—federal, state, and local.
Those rulings can have major consequences. Perhaps most famously,
Miranda v. Arizona26 changed police practices nationwide, making the Miranda
warnings an ever-present feature of custodial arrests. That case was, to be sure,
the high-water mark of the Warren Court’s interventions into the criminal
sphere.27 But the Court’s ability to profoundly shape the practice of criminal
law persists. For a more recent example, consider Apprendi v. New Jersey28 and
its progeny. In a series of cases, the Court held the sentencing schemes of a
number of states,29 as well as the federal government,30 unconstitutional.
Similarly, the Court’s decision in Jones v. United States31 sharply limited law
enforcement’s use of GPS tracking devices on automobiles, forcing the FBI
alone to immediately turn off nearly three thousand devices.32 The Court
continues to be a key policymaker in the criminal justice arena, even if it is not
as willing to dictate the fine details of policy as it was in the days of Miranda.
Meanwhile, no other single institution in America is nearly as powerful
in shaping policy over criminal justice. Congress and state legislatures can
enact substantive criminal laws that govern only within their own
jurisdictional domains—and even within those domains, legislatures’ ability
to set policy is shared with separately accountable prosecutors.33 The United
States Department of Justice (DOJ) plays some role in regulating state and

25 See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1019
(2006) (noting that, despite the growth in federal statutes and prosecutions, “states still bear most
of the responsibility for the regulation of crime”).
26 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
27 See David Rossman, Resurrecting Miranda’s Right to Counsel, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2017)
(“Miranda represented the high-water mark of the criminal procedure revolution of the 1960s.”).
28 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
29 See id. at 491-92; see also Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 274 (2007); Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004).
30 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244-45 (2005).
31 565 U.S. 400, 404, 413 (2012).
32 Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Ruling Prompts FBI to Turn Oﬀ 3,000 Tracking Devices, ABC
NEWS (Mar. 7, 2012), https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/03/supreme-court-ruling-promptsfbi-to-turn-oﬀ-3000-tracking-devices [https://perma.cc/SU3K-L5W2].
33 For a discussion of the fragmentation of power within the criminal justice system, see Daniel
Epps, Checks and Balances in the Criminal Law, 74 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript
at 60) (on ﬁle with authors).
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local law enforcement by enforcing federal civil-rights statutes. But it tends
to intervene only in cases involving the worst abuses.34
In addition, it is surely true, as Rachel Harmon has observed, that federal
constitutional doctrine plays a relatively small role in regulating policing
when compared to state and local law.35 Our point, however, is not that the
Supreme Court occupies the regulatory ﬁeld; state legislatures and state
agencies have more power within their jurisdictions. Our point instead is that
the Court is the most powerful regulator with authority over the whole
country’s criminal justice apparatus. Quite simply, if one hopes to eﬀectuate
change governing the entire criminal justice system in a single shot, the
Supreme Court is the only show in town.
For these reasons, one can think of the Supreme Court as eﬀectively the
nation’s chief—and only—agency charged with regulating the criminal justice
system as a whole. The Justices themselves might bristle at this description,
which seems inconsistent with the idea of the Court as a court. We do not
mean to imply that the Court, in its interventions in the criminal arena, has
transgressed its proper judicial role (though some would make that claim
about particularly adventurous decisions like Miranda). There are certainly
differences between the Supreme Court and true regulatory agencies—perhaps
most importantly, unlike ordinary agencies, the Court can make “rules” only
in the context of adjudicating concrete disputes.36
Nonetheless, we think understanding the Court as a kind of regulatory
agency can be illuminating. First, it hammers home the extent to which there
34 For a discussion on the limits of DOJ’s willingness to bring federal criminal charges against
local law enforcement oﬃcers, see Adam Harris Kurland, The Enduring Virtues of Deferential
Federalism: The Federal Government’s Proper Role in Prosecuting Law Enforcement Officers for Civil
Rights Offenses, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 776-78 (2019). Criminal prosecutions are not the only tool
DOJ uses to regulate local law enforcement, however. DOJ also “subsidizes reform . . . by providing
grants to local departments to encourage speciﬁc remedial measures.” Rachel Harmon, Limited
Leverage: Federal Remedies and Policing Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 33, 55 (2012). In
practice, however, these grants “overwhelmingly . . . serve purposes other than promoting civil
rights.” Id. DOJ also can seek injunctive relief against police departments to remedy patterns or
practices of conduct that violate citizens’ civil rights. Holly James McMickle, Letting DOJ Lead the
Way: Why DOJ’s Pattern or Practice Authority Is the Most Effective Tool to Control Racial Profiling, 13
GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 311, 311 n.1, 323-25 (2003). Again, though, this tool “has yet to achieve
status as a national oversight mechanism for all police actions,” given DOJ’s traditional reluctance
to interfere too heavily in state and local policing because of federalism concerns. Id. at 336-37. For
a more optimistic account of the executive branch’s ability to further criminal justice reform, see
generally Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV.
811 (2017).
35 See Rachel Harmon, Reconsidering Criminal Procedure: Teaching the Law of the Police, 60 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 391, 394, 397-98 (2016) (discussing state and local law’s role in funding, training, and
managing police conduct).
36 See infra note 45. In comparison, traditional agencies can ordinarily choose to make policy
by case-by-case adjudication or by prospective rulemaking. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 203 (1947).
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is no other institution in America that has the authority to supervise the
nation’s criminal justice system. This is odd, given that for almost every aspect
of American society, there is some federal czar, commissioner, or secretary
charged with making rules, or at least trying to inﬂuence policy, for the entire
country. Yet when it comes to criminal justice, the Supreme Court stands on
its own—perhaps because criminal justice has long been seen as within the
responsibility of courts.37 The situation may also be an artifact of the Court’s
willingness to step up and rein in some of the system’s worst excesses for a
signiﬁcant part of the twentieth century, making the need for another
regulatory institution seem less apparent.
Thinking of the Court as a criminal justice regulatory agency also
highlights the ways in which the Court, and courts in general, are imperfect
regulators. Compared in the abstract to administrative agencies, the Supreme
Court is signiﬁcantly constrained. It cannot freely gather information, as
norms of the adversarial process typically prevent judges from relying on
facts that were not presented by the parties.38 It cannot (entirely) set its own
regulatory agenda.39 And courts face both legal and practical limitations on
their ability to order the kinds of structural changes that would be necessary
for certain kinds of reform.40
Given these deﬁciencies, many see the Supreme Court as hopelessly
inadequate as a criminal justice regulator. Consider, for example, scholarly
37 See BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 73 (2017)
(“Many people seem to believe that it is the responsibility of judges to supervise law enforcement.”).
38 See infra note 47 and accompanying text. The Court seems particularly ill equipped to
acquire what are typically called “legislative” facts—facts about the world generally, distinguished
from facts about the parties in a particular case. Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts,
100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1759 (2014). And the Court’s attempts to deal with this deﬁciency are
problematic. As Allison Orr Larsen has shown, the Court appears to be increasingly relying on
untested factual assertions made in amicus briefs when writing opinions. See id. at 1761-64.
39 To be sure, the Supreme Court is more able to set its own agenda than are other courts,
given that the Justices are largely free to choose their cases from the many thousands of certiorari
petitions ﬁled each year. See Daniel Epps & William Ortman, The Lottery Docket, 116 MICH. L. REV.
705, 710-17 (2018) (describing the Court’s discretion in detail). Nonetheless, the Court cannot choose
to address a particular issue if no petitions are ﬁled raising that issue. See Evan H. Caminker, Sincere
and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2357 n.168 (1999) (“[T]he
Court still lacks aﬃrmative agenda control because it cannot create a vehicle for deciding a particular
issue; it must await one.”); see also NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 125 (1994) (“[J]udges are far less able
to initiate decision-making than legislators. . . . Judges must await action brought by moving parties,
often private parties.”).
40 See Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in
Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 59-63 (1979) (arguing that courts face serious institutional
limitations in attempting to fashion remedies to eﬀect institutional change); William A. Fletcher,
The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 645-49
(1982) (arguing that remedies involved in institutional reform involve diﬀerent forms of power than
those which courts typically exercise).
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critiques of judicial eﬀorts to regulate law enforcement. Barry Friedman has
argued that “[t]he courts are not up to the task” given their limited remedial
toolkit and lack of democratic accountability.41 Christopher Slobogin
observes that courts lack expertise “about resource allocation and the relative
eﬃcacy of enforcement methods” that police departments themselves
possess.42 Daphna Renan argues that courts’ “transactional” approach to
Fourth Amendment issues, which “focuses on a discrete law enforcementcitizen encounter and the question whether that one-oﬀ interaction is
constitutionally reasonable,” makes them ill equipped to address issues of
programmatic government surveillance.43 Andrew Crespo has described this
focus on one-oﬀ interactions as “transactional myopia.”44
Despite these shortcomings, no institution seems likely to supplant the
Supreme Court as the preeminent regulator of criminal justice nationwide, at
least not in the short term. And even if other institutions take greater
responsibility in the future, the Court is likely to remain one of the most
important policymakers in this sphere. In light of that reality, it is important
to identify whether there are systemic problems in how the Supreme Court
decides cases—and thus makes policy—in the criminal arena. There are, as
the next Section reveals.
B. Representation Distortion
Notwithstanding its prominent role in criminal justice regulation, the
Supreme Court remains a court. Its decisions are part of—usually the
culmination of—litigation. And in our adversarial tradition, parties, not
courts, control litigation. Parties choose what cases to bring, what arguments
to make, and what facts to present. Various norms and rules of the
adjudicative process make courts dependent on these choices. Courts (at least
federal courts) cannot decide issues outside of discrete cases or
controversies;45 they typically treat arguments or objections not raised by the
FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 73.
Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 121 (2016). Along
somewhat similar lines, John Rappaport argues that courts should encourage law-enforcement
agencies to regulate themselves, because law enforcement possesses “greater experience and
expertise” vis-à-vis courts. John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF.
L. REV. 205, 234-35 (2015).
43 Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039,
1041 (2016).
44 Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129
HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2057 (2016). Crespo argues that the scholars emphasizing courts’ transactional
myopia underestimate courts’ ability to obtain “systemic facts” about how the criminal justice system
operates. See id. at 2052, 2108-12.
45 Federal courts are limited to resolving discrete “cases” and “controversies.” See U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2 (capitalization altered). This requirement has long been understood to prohibit federal
41
42

2020]

The Defender General

1481

parties as forfeited;46 and they are supposed to blind themselves to facts about
the parties not presented by the litigants.47
There are, to be sure, reasonable justiﬁcations for these restrictions. The
case-or-controversy requirement and corresponding ban on advisory opinions
are rooted in the separation of powers;48 the reluctance to consider forfeited
arguments is thought to encourage eﬃciency and fairness to the opposing
side;49 and constraints on extrajudicial factﬁnding preserve the fairness of the
proceedings and impartiality of the adjudicators.50 At the same time, the
restrictions have downsides—which manifest as some of the institutional
deﬁciencies of courts we considered in the previous Section.
Of course, many institutional choices involve diﬃcult tradeoﬀs.51 But
there is reason to think that the limitations of judicial decisionmaking are
especially problematic when the Court acts as a criminal justice regulator. The
party-driven nature of litigation distorts the rules governing criminal justice
over time. That is because of asymmetries in how diﬀerent interests are
represented at the Supreme Court. One set of interests—the prosecution’s—
has consistent advantages, both in individual cases and in the larger eﬀort to
shape the Court’s jurisprudence.
courts from rendering “advisory” opinions on issues not squarely presented by a case litigated by
two actually adverse parties. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 52-56 (7th ed. 2015).
46 See, e.g., FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 226 n.4 (2013) (“Because
this argument was not raised by the parties or passed on by the lower courts, we do not consider
it.”); United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2 (1981) (“We decline to consider this
argument since it was not raised by either of the parties here or below.”), overruled on other grounds
by DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
47 See FED. R. EVID. 201 (identifying narrow circumstances in which courts may take notice
of adjudicative facts not supported by record evidence); see also FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory
committee’s note (defining “adjudicative facts” as facts that “relate to their parties, their activities,
their properties, their businesses” (quoting 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 353 (1958))).
48 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 47 (7th ed. 2016) (“[S]eparation
of powers is maintained by keeping the courts out of the legislative process. The judicial role is
limited to deciding actual disputes; it does not include giving advice to Congress or the president.”).
49 See, e.g., Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009) (observing that objections must
be raised below in order to “give[] the district court the opportunity to consider and resolve”
objections and also to “prevent[] a litigant from ‘sandbagging’ the court”); Oﬃce of Pers. Mgmt. v.
Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 441 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The courts’ general refusal to
consider arguments not raised by the parties . . . is founded in part on the need to ensure that each
party has fair notice of the arguments to which he must respond.”).
50 See FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note (“The reason we use trial-type
procedure . . . is that we make the practical judgement, on the basis of experience, that taking
evidence, subject to cross-examination and rebuttal, is the best way to resolve controversies involving
disputes of adjudicative facts, that is, facts pertaining to the parties.” (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis,
A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, in PERSPECTIVES OF LAW 69 (Roscoe
Pound et al. eds., 1964) (quotation marks omitted))).
51 For nuanced discussion of institutional choice, see generally KOMESAR, supra note 39.
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The following subsections explain the speciﬁc advantages that the
government enjoys in the Court and why those advantages are likely to distort
doctrine. As we see it, three signiﬁcant asymmetries favor prosecution-side
interests at the High Court. First, the government is a unitary actor that can
act to protect its collective interests across a range of cases. Criminal
defendants, by contrast, are a large and dispersed group of individuals; their
personal incentives do not always correspond with what is best for defendants
as a class. Second, lawyers representing criminal defendants are often less
experienced, and thus less capable, than their government counterparts.
Third, government lawyers—particularly the lawyers for the federal
government—work within institutional structures that enable them to
develop signiﬁcant reserves of credibility with the Justices.
These advantages do not mean that the Supreme Court grants every
certiorari petition the government files, or that the government wins every
criminal case litigated on the merits. Nonetheless, there is good reason to
believe that these asymmetries have an eﬀect on the doctrine over the long
run, resulting in regulation that is friendlier to government interests than
it might otherwise be.
1. Uniﬁed Vision
In every criminal case at the Supreme Court, a prosecutor will be seeking
to vindicate the government’s long-term interests. (Sometimes there will be
two prosecutors, when the Solicitor General is participating as an amicus
curiae in support of a state.) On the other side of the “v.” is not someone
advocating for the long-term interests of criminal defendants. Instead, there
is a particular criminal defendant and his lawyer. Put another way: Any
Supreme Court criminal case can establish a precedent aﬀecting the rights of
every criminal suspect or defendant in the country—but only one criminal
defendant is actually involved in litigating it.
At ﬁrst glance, it might not be obvious why this matters. Any particular
defendant, one might think, has a strong interest in prevailing in order to
avoid criminal sanctions. So then shouldn’t any given defendant be equipped
to advocate for the interests of criminal defendants more generally?
Sometimes, the answer is surely yes. When the Court faces a binary choice
between two rules—one favoring the government, and one favoring
defendants—any defendant is reasonably well positioned to act on behalf of
the larger pool of criminal defendants.52 In those cases, so long as the
52 For example, in Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686 (2019), where the question before the
Court was straightforward and eﬀectively binary—should the Excessive Fines Clause be
incorporated against the states or not?—the defendant, Tyson Timbs, was in a good position to make
arguments that would beneﬁt all others.
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defendant has good counsel—a problem we will consider separately below—
that defendant may be an eﬀective “class representative.” But there are many
cases in which that will not be true—and many other ways in which litigant
incentives and ethical rules give the government an advantage in the battle to
shape the rules.
We will illustrate this claim with examples, but it is helpful to begin with
the framework from Marc Galanter’s classic analysis of “why the ‘haves’ tend
to come out ahead” in the legal system.53 Galanter distinguishes between
“one-shotters” and “repeat players” in litigation.54 One-shotters “have only
occasional recourse to the courts” whereas repeat players “are engaged in
many similar litigations over time.”55 As Galanter explains, repeat players
have many advantages that help them win individual cases, including
specialized knowledge, “economies of scale,” and earned credibility with
judicial decisionmakers.56 Most crucially for present purposes, repeat players
can “play for rules in litigation itself.”57 That is, repeat players can make
choices aimed at setting favorable precedents for future cases—even if those
choices make the repeat player less likely to prevail in a particular case. Oneshotters, by contrast, are only concerned with winning the case at hand.58
Galanter’s distinction captures an important dynamic in Supreme Court
criminal litigation. The two sides are playing fundamentally diﬀerent games.
The government plays for the rules, whereas each criminal defendant (and
that defendant’s lawyer) must play to win the case.
Playing for the rules means many things in practice. Consider some
possibilities. The ﬁrst involves vehicle selection. The factual details of a
particular case can affect a court’s choice of rule to govern future cases. As
Frederick Schauer has explained, cognitive biases mean that concrete cases can
distort a court’s rulemaking “whenever the concrete case is nonrepresentative
of the full array of events that the ensuing rule or principle will encompass.”59
Making matters worse, it may be “extremely diﬃcult . . . for judges to avoid
making what to them appears to be the correct decision with respect to the
particular facts at issue and the particular parties before them.”60 For these
reasons, there is cause to suspect that idiosyncratic features of a particular
case might inﬂuence a court’s choice of rule more than it rationally should.
53 Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 124 (1974).
54 Id. at 97.
55 Id.
56 See id. at 98-101.
57 Id. at 100.
58 See id.
59 Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 884 (2006).
60 Id. at 899.
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One might hope that the Supreme Court, of all courts, would be more
resistant to such biases, given the care with which it selects cases and the time
it devotes to deciding them.61 But Schauer points to a number of examples
indicating that this bias plagues even Supreme Court decisionmaking.62
Litigators understand this, at least intuitively. “Impact litigators” seeking to
change the law often devote substantial eﬀort to identifying sympathetic
plaintiﬀs in the hopes of better persuading the Court.63 The practice has been
going on for more than a century, at least: The dispute that led to Plessy v.
Ferguson64 was carefully choreographed by lawyers looking to challenge
Louisiana’s Separate Car Act.65 Homer Plessy was apparently chosen as the
test litigant because he was light-skinned and so “the arbitrariness of the
classiﬁcation would be accentuated.”66 Careful plaintiﬀ selection is now a
commonplace tactic for those seeking to engineer Supreme Court victories;
the architects of the Obergefell v. Hodges litigation,67 for example, “selected
and groomed their plaintiﬀs with great care.”68
There is every reason to think that government lawyers, too, pay close
attention to the factual details of cases in determining how best to inﬂuence
the Court. As former Acting Solicitor General Barbara Underwood has
explained, “[I]n responding to a petition for certiorari, or in deciding whether
to ﬁle one, the Solicitor General is likely to consider both whether the
question presented is worthy of Supreme Court review, and whether the
particular case is a good vehicle for presenting that question to the Court.”69
But more than that, Underwood notes, “In defending a federal statute, . . . the
Solicitor General’s interest in selecting cases may be not just to ﬁnd a case
61 For discussion of the Court’s case selection process, see DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE
SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1980), and Epps & Ortman, supra note
39, at 710-17.
62 See Schauer, supra note 59, at 901-03.
63 See Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiﬀs, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 136, 137 (2015) (“[T]he selection
of plaintiﬀs is one of the most signiﬁcant decisions a cause lawyer can make.”); Kimberly
Strawbridge Robinson, Supreme Court Lawsuits in Search of a Plaintiﬀ, BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 16,
2018, 3:58 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/supreme-court-lawsuits-insearch-of-a-plaintiﬀ [https://perma.cc/5AXN-N5QQ] (“Public interest lawyers on both the right
and the left often seek out plaintiﬀs and initiate litigation speciﬁcally to change the law, [Erwin]
Chemerinsky said.”).
64 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
65 For a thorough retelling of this legal choreography, including the lengthy process of
plaintiff selection, see CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATION 28-43 (1987).
66 Id. at 31.
67 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
68 Godsoe, supra note 63, at 137-38.
69 Barbara D. Underwood, Facts on the Ground and Federalism in the Air: The Solicitor General’s
Eﬀort to Defend Federal Statutes During the Federalism Revival, 21 SAINT JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
473, 475 (2007).
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that presents the issue squarely but rather to ﬁnd a case that presents the
government’s position in the most favorable light.”70
Former Solicitor General Seth Waxman uses the phrase “procedural
inﬂuence” to describe “the ability of the Solicitor General—on occasion—to
aﬀect which cases come to the Court on a particular issue, and in what
order.”71 The Solicitor General exercises this power by choosing which cases
to appeal.72 If, for example, a legal issue is likely to recur, the Solicitor General
may decline to authorize an appeal of a loss in the lower courts to better await
a “case[] in which the government’s position can be cast in its best light.”73 As
one observer puts it, the Solicitor General “does not sit beside the Justices on
the bench, but he stands in place of them when he decides which cases should
be taken to the Court.”74
Criminal cases present the government with many opportunities to
deploy this strategy. The high volume of criminal cases means that the
government will often be able to choose a vehicle that frames an issue for the
Justices in the most favorable light. By the same token, the government can
sometimes avoid vehicles with particularly compelling facts for the
defendant’s side of the issue by simply declining to appeal adverse rulings, or
even by “confess[ing] . . . error” in the judgment below on diﬀerent grounds.75
From the government’s perspective, any one criminal case has relatively low
stakes, and so the consequences of giving up on one case can be worth bearing
in order to maximize the chances of shaping the rules that will govern many
more cases in the future.
In some instances, the government can be particularly proactive in identifying
attractive candidates for certiorari. Consider United States v. Fanfan, decided
alongside United States v. Booker.76 In the wake of Blakely v. Washington,77 which
70 Id. A current Deputy Solicitor General has made similar observations. See Malcolm L.
Stewart, United States Appeals: Strategic and Policy Considerations, U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL., Jan. 2013, at
13, 15 (“[T]he government generally takes particular care to select favorable ‘vehicles’ for appellate
consideration of recurring legal issues. The best vehicles are cases in which the facts present the
government’s position in a favorable light, maximizing the likelihood that the government’s view
will strike judges as intuitively fair.”).
71 Seth P. Waxman, Foreword: Does the Solicitor General Matter?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1117
(2001) (emphasis omitted).
72 Lower court decisions against the United States may only be appealed with the approval of
the Solicitor General. See Margaret D. McGaughey, When the United States Loses in a Criminal Case:
The Government Appeal Process, 18 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 297, 309-15 (2017).
73 Stewart, supra note 70, at 16.
74 LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF
LAW 6 (1987).
75 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Supreme Court’s Controversial GVRs—and an Alternative, 107
MICH. L. REV. 711, 731 (2009); see also infra text accompanying notes 111–121.
76 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
77 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004).

1486

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1469

had struck down a state sentencing-guidelines system on Sixth Amendment
grounds, lower federal courts were beginning to declare the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines system unconstitutional.78 Eager to ﬁnd ideal candidates for
certiorari, the Solicitor General’s oﬃce “canvassed US Attorney’s Oﬃces
around the country for prospects, plucked Fanfan’s case from the First Circuit
while it was still pending there, and took it directly to the Supreme Court.”79
Our point is not to endorse strategic vehicle selection at the Court as a
normative matter. The practice is at least sometimes troubling. For instance,
the decision to pick Homer Plessy as a test litigant because he was lightskinned raises diﬃcult questions about, for example, when impact litigators
might reinforce prejudice by acknowledging it in client selection. But those
questions—and the appropriateness of strategic vehicle selection in general—
are for another day. For our purposes, what is critical is that this is a real
phenomenon and there is no obvious way to prevent the government from
engaging in it in criminal cases. Therein lies the asymmetry: criminal defendants
are in no position to conduct such coordinated, strategic behavior before the
Supreme Court. The problem is that defendants are not an undifferentiated
whole; they are individuals with their own incentives. Sometimes, those
incentives line up with the interests of defendants more generally, but not
inevitably.80 An unsympathetic defendant has every incentive to appeal his
conviction even if he has virtually no chance of obtaining a reversal and even
if his case is a poor vehicle for influencing the Supreme Court. That defendant
is entitled to counsel on direct appeal.81 Although an attorney is not required
to ﬁle a frivolous appeal,82 the decision to appeal otherwise remains in the
client’s control.83 Further, while defendants have no constitutional right to
court-appointed counsel for discretionary appeals such as certiorari petitions,84

78 For a discussion of the case law that developed at the circuit-court level between Blakely and
Booker, see Kathleen A. Hirce, Comment, A Swift and Temporary Instruction: The Eﬀectiveness of the
Circuit Courts Between Blakely and Booker, 2 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 271 (2005).
79 McGaughey, supra note 72, at 313.
80 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 796 (1994)
(observing that while criminal defendants are “a kind of private attorney general,” they are the “worst
kind” because they “will litigate on the worst set of facts” and because they “care[] only about the
case at hand . . . and [have] no long view”).
81 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-57 (1963).
82 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
83 See AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
§ 4-5.2(b)(viii) (4th ed. 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/
DefenseFunctionFourthEdition [https://perma.cc/2NV4-CC4P] (“The decisions ultimately to
be made by a competent client, after full consultation with defense counsel, include . . . whether
to appeal . . . .”).
84 See Ross v. Moﬃtt, 417 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1974).
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appointed lawyers in the federal system are required to ﬁle a certiorari
petition where such a petition would not be frivolous.85
And because a lawyer’s duty is always to her client, it would be
inappropriate for counsel to refuse to pursue an appeal or ﬁle a certiorari
petition, when doing so might beneﬁt the client, simply because it might not
be in the long-term strategic interests of defendants more generally. Indeed,
lawyers who have made such tradeoﬀs to the detriment of their clients have
been criticized for conﬂicts of interest.86 At the Supreme Court, this
asymmetry puts the government in a much stronger position than defendants
to inﬂuence the Justices through vehicle selection.87
Of course, “the government” is not a monolithic entity. In the realm of
constitutional criminal procedure, there are a multitude of governments
involved, including, most importantly, states. Does that fact undercut the
story we have been telling thus far? It could, if state involvement undermined
the Solicitor General’s ability to screen potential vehicles. In practice, this is
not a signiﬁcant concern. First, “[l]ike the Justice Department, a state
attorney general’s oﬃce has the option of selecting from among many cases
the most compelling facts for obtaining Supreme Court review.”88 State
prosecutors, that is, have the same motivation, and ability, as the Solicitor
General to play for the rule, not for the case. Second, state attorneys general
often coordinate with each other, and with the Solicitor General.89 Thus, the
85 See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO.
89-62, at 7 (1965) (“[C]ounsel appointed on appeal should advise the defendant of his right to initiate
a further review by the ﬁling of a petition for certiorari, and to ﬁle such petition, if requested by the
defendant.”); see also, e.g., Mark J. Langer, Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, Informational Packet for Court Appointed Counsel 4 (rev. Jan. 10, 2020), https://
www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL%20-%20RPP%20-%20CJA%20Letter
%20to%20Court%20Appointed%20Counsel/$FILE/CJALTR2.pdf [https://perma.cc/HU95-WM3V]
(detailing the obligations of appointed counsel with regard to petitions for certiorari).
86 A charge of this nature was leveled against the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s eﬀorts in
capital cases in the 1970s for supposedly putting the interests of death penalty abolition above the
interests of individual clients. See EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND
RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 57-63, 360-61, 430-31 (2013) (discussing
the conﬂict in LDF’s roles).
87 The asymmetry between a monolithic government and dispersed individual defendants has
signiﬁcant eﬀects throughout the criminal justice system, well beyond the Supreme Court context.
John Blume has observed that prosecutors’ use of aggressive charging to induce defendants to plead
guilty would grind to a halt if “the criminal defense bar rose up in collective action.” John H. Blume,
How the “Shackles” of Individual Ethics Prevent Structural Reform in the American Criminal Justice System,
42 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 23, 29 (2016). The problem, though, is that
“[t]he individualized ethical ethos of the modern criminal defense lawyer . . . dooms actions to
achieve collective good.” Id. at 31.
88 Charles G. Cole, How Your Case Can Catch the Supreme Court’s Eye, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1987,
at 15, 15.
89 In criminal cases, “the states can expect amicus support from the Solicitor General’s Oﬃce
and from the other state attorneys general.” Id. The states have developed institutional structures
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diﬀerent governments can coordinate in a way that defendants cannot.
Finally, when a state ﬁles a less-than-optimal certiorari petition, the Solicitor
General can decline to participate as an amicus, in the hopes of reducing the
likelihood that the petition will be granted.
Thus, in summary, the government can consistently shape the context in
which the Court considers particular questions. And yet criminal defendants
cannot, since each defendant with a plausible argument for certiorari has
every incentive to ﬁle a petition. Assuming that the choice of vehicle has some
inﬂuence over the Court’s decisionmaking—and the most sophisticated
Supreme Court litigators believe that it does—this asymmetry will, over the
long run of cases, introduce some degree of pro-government tilt that would
not otherwise exist into the resulting legal rules.
But this is not the only advantage the government has by virtue of its
ability to play for the rules. The government is also better equipped to make
persuasive arguments on the merits. Consider a case where the Court must
select from a range of possible rules (or standards), rather than make a simple
binary choice. The defense lawyer in such a case must argue for the rule that will
enable her client to prevail in the case—even if the Court appears more likely
to be persuaded by a slightly less defendant-protective rule. The government,
by contrast, can argue for whichever rule it thinks is most likely to convince
the Court—even if that rule might lead to a “loss” in the particular case.
The Solicitor General is particularly well equipped to play this role. His
oﬃce (the lawyer currently serving in that role is male) presents argument in
seventy-two percent of the Court’s criminal cases, either as the prosecutor in
federal cases or as amicus in support of the prosecutor in state cases, giving it
an outsized power to shape the law.90 And it often argues for rules that seem
designed to provide narrow victories for government interests, or at least to
limit the damage of a ruling that goes against the government’s wishes. Defense
lawyers, by contrast, are less able to behave strategically in this manner, as they
cannot sacrifice the interests of a particular defendant to obtain a greater victory.
We illustrate these dynamics with two examples. The ﬁrst is Maryland v.
Shatzer,91 where the Court confronted questions it had left unresolved in
Edwards v. Arizona.92 In Edwards, the Court held that when a suspect in
to help enable cooperation. In the 1980s, the National Association of Attorneys General established
the Supreme Court Clearinghouse Project, a permanent institution that helps advise state
attorneys general on Supreme Court advocacy and coordinate amicus activity. See Cornell W.
Clayton, Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as National Policymakers, 56
REV. POL. 525, 542-44 (1994).
90 Crespo, supra note 3, at 2013 (describing oral arguments during the ﬁrst decade of the
Roberts Court).
91 559 U.S. 98 (2010).
92 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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custody is read the Miranda warnings and tells police he wants a lawyer, not
only must interrogation cease, but police cannot thereafter reinitiate
interrogation without counsel, even if the suspect consents to it.93 Once a
suspect invokes his right to counsel, that is, Edwards applies an irrebuttable
presumption that subsequent police-initiated custodial interrogation is
coercive.94 But for how long? And can intervening events (like the suspect
being released from custody) terminate the presumption, such that the police
may again initiate custodial interrogation as they can with anyone else—that
is, by reading the Miranda warnings and obtaining a waiver? These were the
questions before the Court in Shatzer.95
Shatzer demonstrates how the interests of a particular defendant can run
contrary to the interests of defendants as a class. In August 2003, while
Michael Shatzer was serving time in a Maryland prison, a police detective
attempted to question him about allegations that he had sexually abused his
three-year-old son. He declined to talk without a lawyer. In March 2006,
more than two and a half years later, Shatzer was still incarcerated when
additional evidence of the abuse emerged. A diﬀerent detective went to see
Shatzer (by then in a diﬀerent facility) and read him the Miranda warnings.
This time he agreed to speak and incriminated himself. Based in part on the
incriminating statement, Shatzer was found guilty of sexual child abuse.96
Shatzer’s case thus turned on whether the Edwards presumption still
applied when the detective visited him in prison in 2006. At oral argument,
it became clear that there were three plausible answers to the question of how
long the Edwards presumption lasts.97 One possibility, the one pressed by
Shatzer’s attorney, was that it lasts indeﬁnitely.98 Once a defendant invokes
his right to counsel during a custodial interrogation, that is, the Edwards
presumption applies to him, apparently forever. Another possibility, the one
Id. at 484-87.
See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 356 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Edwards
for the proposition that “[t]he initiation by the police of contact with an unrepresented defendant,
after the invocation of the right to counsel during interrogation or at arraignment, creates an
irrebuttable presumption that a defendant’s waiver of his privilege against compelled selfincrimination is not voluntary”).
95 Brief for Petitioner at i, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680).
96 The facts are drawn from the Court’s opinion. See Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 100-02.
97 In addition to the three possibilities discussed in the text, Justice Breyer promoted a
perplexing approach derived from analogy to the rules of legal ethics. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 20-21, 41, Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (No. 08-680) (suggesting that if there is a breach in
custody and time has passed since an individual’s initial interrogation, a questioner who “did not and
would not reasonably believe that the suspect was looking for or was represented by counsel” can
permissibly interrogate the individual in the absence of counsel). No other Justice appeared
interested in Breyer’s approach, and Justice Scalia mocked it openly. Id. at 42. In the end, Justice
Breyer joined Justice Scalia’s majority opinion without comment. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 99.
98 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 34, 36.
93
94
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favored by prosecutors, was that the Edwards presumption ends the moment
a person is released from the custody in which he invoked Miranda.99 Thus,
once there is a “break in custody,”100 the police can subsequently initiate a
custodial interrogation just by reading the Miranda warnings and getting a
waiver. It became clear at oral argument that neither of these extreme positions
was attractive to the Justices. A middle position emerged—that the Edwards
presumption ends when there is a “break in custody” plus the passage of some
amount of time.101 The crucial question thus became—how much time?
But consider the position that put Shatzer’s attorney—Celia Davis, an
assistant public defender in Maryland—in. The facts were not on her side.
Two and a half years had passed between her client’s “break in custody” and
his subsequent Miranda waiver.102 While no one at oral argument could
predict exactly how long beyond the end of the initial custody the Court might
be willing to apply the Edwards presumption, it would clearly not go for two
and a half years. Thus, the only way for Davis to prevail was to persist in the
argument that was going nowhere—that the Edwards presumption lasts
forever. Her predicament even became a source of humor. Justice Alito asked
the question: “If we were to choose a time period here, what would—what
would you propose?”103 Without pause, Davis insisted: “Oh, anything over
two years and seven months.”104 The transcript reﬂects laughter in the
courtroom.105 Pressed by Justice Alito for a “serious” answer to his question,
Davis replied that “Edwards continues to the end,” explaining further that it
is “all or nothing.”106
A lawyer representing the interests of defendants as a class could have
taken a diﬀerent tactic. Seeing that the “all or nothing” argument wasn’t
working, she could have argued, as a compromise, that the Edwards
presumption should continue until a break in custody is followed by a
relatively long period of time—say sixty or ninety days. That wouldn’t have
helped Shatzer, but his case was a lost cause, and it would have helped
defendants in other cases. That option wasn’t ethically available to Davis,
who, quite appropriately, stuck to her position.

Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 12-13, 14-15, 20-21, 28.
As the Court analyzed the case, the “break in custody” in Shatzer’s case occurred almost
simultaneously with his invoking Miranda. That’s because the Court regarded his return from the
interrogation to the “general prison population” within the prison to be a break in custody. Shatzer,
559 U.S. at 113-14.
103 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 56.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 57.
106 Id. (emphasis added).
99
100
101
102
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The strategic retreat closed to Shatzer’s attorney was very much open to
the government lawyers at argument, and they took it. When it became clear
that at least some Justices rejected his preferred rule (that the Edwards
presumption ends the moment there is a break in custody), the Attorney
General of Maryland quickly pivoted to accept a short time limit—seven
days—as a compromise.107 He was joined at argument by an attorney from
the U.S. Solicitor General’s Office, Toby Heytens, lending that office’s gravitas
and expertise to the state prosecutor’s eﬀorts.108 Heytens indicated the federal
government was also open to a timing rule.109
In a 7–2 decision, the Court ruled that the “only logical endpoint of [the]
Edwards [presumption rule] is termination of Miranda custody and any of its
lingering eﬀects,” which takes “14 days.”110 Though Maryland and the United
States had not gotten all they wanted, this was a fairly signiﬁcant victory for
their interests. One can only wonder the degree to which the categorical
fourteen-day rule was shaped by the asymmetrical dynamics we have
described. Michael Shatzer was a particularly unappealing defendant; would
the Court inevitably have landed on the fourteen-day rule with a more
defendant-friendly vehicle? Might the Justices have chosen a more defendantprotective rule (sixty or ninety days following a break in custody, perhaps) if,
alongside Shatzer’s counsel at the oral argument, someone had been arguing
for the interests of defendants as a class? There’s no way to know for certain.
Nonetheless, it is easy to believe that the asymmetrical dynamic of criminal
litigation in the Supreme Court aﬀected the doctrine.
The second example shows how the Solicitor General, unlike defense
lawyers, can play for the rule, even when that means conceding the case.
Today, the constitutionality of plea bargaining—that is, the practice of
exchanging “leniency” for guilty pleas—is ﬁrmly settled.111 It wasn’t always.
As late as the 1950s, plea bargaining’s legality was an open question.112 In 1957,
a panel of the Fifth Circuit dramatically held in Shelton v. United States that a
guilty plea premised on a prosecutor’s promise of leniency is presumed
107 See id. at 15 (“But if—in Justice Kennedy’s question, if we were going to adopt a time limit,
I—we would suggest, like, for example, a seven-day time limit.”).
108 See id. at 20. Maryland also had the support of thirty-seven states in an amicus brief. See
Brief of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98
(2010) (No. 08-680).
109 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 28.
110 Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 108, 110.
111 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (acknowledging the prosecutor’s
“constitutionally legitimate” interest in plea bargaining); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753
(1970) (holding that “[t]he Fifth Amendment does not reach so far” as to forbid plea bargaining).
112 See William Ortman, When Plea Bargaining Became Normal, 100 B.U. L. REV . 1435, 1493-95
(2020) (explaining that plea bargaining’s legality was in doubt in part because of uncertainty over
applicability of the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine).
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involuntary, adding: “Justice and liberty are not the subjects of bargaining
and barter.”113 The Department of Justice persuaded the en banc Fifth Circuit
to rehear and reverse the panel,114 but the defendant kept the case alive by
ﬁling a certiorari petition.
From the government’s perspective, the certiorari petition was
extraordinarily dangerous. American criminal justice had already come to
depend on plea bargaining.115 If the Court granted the petition and agreed
with the Fifth Circuit panel, the consequences for the American criminal
justice system would have been enormous. The government’s strategic
interests were thus clear—far better to sacriﬁce Shelton’s conviction for
violating the Dyer Act (with a one-year sentence)116 than to risk throwing
state and federal criminal courts into chaos.
And so, in response to Shelton’s certiorari petition, the Solicitor General
confessed error, but not on the issue that the Fifth Circuit judges had tussled
over.117 Rather, the Solicitor General “confess[ed]” that the trial court had
“err[ed]” by not conducting a sufficient inquiry into the voluntariness of
Shelton’s guilty plea.118 The Solicitor General’s basis for confessing error
was ﬂimsy to the point of being pretextual.119 Albert Alschuler conjectures—
we think persuasively—as to what was really going on: “[T]he Solicitor
General . . . may have assessed the probable votes of individual Supreme
Court Justices, may have sensed a substantial likelihood that the Court would
hold the practice of plea bargaining unlawful, and may have sought to
foreclose this ruling through a confession of error on narrow and disingenuous
grounds.”120 The Court went along with the Solicitor General, issuing a brief
per curiam opinion granting the certiorari petition and remanding for further
proceedings.121
Because the Solicitor General can play for the rule, he was free to decide
that preserving plea bargaining was more important to the government’s longterm interests than preserving Shelton’s conviction. It may have been the most
242 F.2d 101, 113 (5th Cir. 1957).
246 F.2d 571, 572 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc).
See Ortman, supra note 112, at 1497 (arguing that plea bargaining had become the ordinary
and largely accepted method of resolving criminal cases in the United States by the middle decades
of the twentieth century).
116 See Shelton, 242 F.2d at 102.
117 Shelton v. United States, 356 U.S. 26, 26 (1958) (per curiam).
118 Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 36 (1979).
Alschuler located the Solicitor General’s confession of error in the Supreme Court library. Id.
119 Both the Fifth Circuit panel and the en banc court had found that issue did not warrant
relief. See id. (citing Shelton, 246 F.2d at 572-73 (en banc); Shelton, 242 F.2d at 112 (panel)). Alschuler
notes that the confession “seemed peculiar” in part because the Solicitor General simply “failed to
mention the ruling of the court of appeals on the issue in question.” Id.
120 Id. at 37.
121 Shelton, 356 U.S. at 26.
113
114
115
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practically consequential confession of error in the Court’s history. Twelve
years later, with Warren Burger having replaced Earl Warren at the center of
the bench, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of plea bargaining.122 As
Alschuler observes, “One wonders whether . . . the history of plea bargaining
might not have taken a dramatically different turn but for the action of the
Solicitor General” in Shelton.123 Just as Shatzer exemplifies the strategic
constraints on defense lawyering in Supreme Court litigation, Shelton illustrates
the government’s free hand, and its potentially momentous consequences.
2. Quality of Advocacy
Criminal defendants face another disadvantage in the battle to shape
Supreme Court doctrine. Though not in every case, they are on average
represented by less experienced—and, we would contend, sometimes less
able—counsel in front of the Court when compared to the prosecution. The
reason why this is so turns on institutional structures and individual incentives.
Consider the government side ﬁrst. In every case directly involving the
United States, the Solicitor General will press the government’s case before
the Court. First established in 1870,124 the Solicitor General has primary
responsibility for nearly all Supreme Court litigation on behalf of the United
States,125 and also is in charge of deciding when the government will seek
appeals of adverse decisions throughout the court system.126 The Solicitor
General has been described as “the country’s most inﬂuential litigator,”127 and
the position is highly coveted, attracting some of the nation’s most talented
(and ambitious) lawyers. Former Solicitors General are typically the subject
of bidding wars by top law ﬁrms when they move to private practice.128
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970); Ortman, supra note 112, at 1494-96.
Alschuler, supra note 118, at 37.
See Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 2, 16 Stat. 162, 162.
The only signiﬁcant exception arises from federal agencies that have “independent
litigation authority.” See Elliott Karr, Essay, Independent Litigation Authority and Calls for the Views
of the Solicitor General, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1080, 1080-81, 1085 & n.28 (2009) (discussing
this authority, the agencies that possess it, and the relationship between these agencies and the
Solicitor General).
126 See supra note 72.
127 Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s Changing Role in
Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1326 (2010).
128 After Solicitor General Paul Clement left oﬃce near the end of the Bush Administration,
for example, he was “the belle of the ball” among law ﬁrms looking to hire him to head their Supreme
Court practices. Dan Slater, Paul Clement: The LeBron James of Law Firm Recruiting, WALL ST. J.:
LAW BLOG (Oct. 27, 2008, 9:22 AM ET), https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/10/27/paul-clement-thelebron-james-of-law-ﬁrm-recruiting [https://perma.cc/2JU2-JMWP]. For an argument that former
Solicitors General may be overpaid by clients in light of the results they produce, see Ryan C. Black
& Ryan J. Owens, The Success of Former Solicitors General in Private Practice: Costly and Unnecessary?,
2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 325, 326-27, 360.
122
123
124
125
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In addition to the Solicitor General himself, the Solicitor General’s Oﬃce
(OSG) employs a number of additional attorneys—four deputies and sixteen
assistants.129 Each is a highly skilled and impressively credentialed Supreme
Court litigator. The OSG enjoys signiﬁcant success at the Court, with a much
higher victory rate than other litigants.130 One recent empirical study
concluded that the OSG is more likely to win its cases than the mere
experience of its attorneys would predict, suggesting that the OSG’s “internal
institutional dynamics” may make it uniquely successful.131
Those institutional dynamics seem to make the OSG particularly able in
the criminal sphere. One of the deputies—until recently, Michael Dreeben—
is assigned primary responsibility for the OSG’s criminal caseload.132 That
deputy has the ability to develop deep expertise in criminal law and
procedure, and to become a particularly experienced advocate before the
Court. During his tenure, Dreeben became “the second most experienced
Supreme Court advocate in the nation.”133 Upon his recent retirement, Dreeben
was lauded as a true master of the craft of appellate advocacy.134 Although the
“criminal deputy” does not conduct all of the OSG’s oral arguments involving
criminal matters, he “manage[s] the federal government’s criminal docket,” as
former Solicitor General Donald Verrilli has explained.135
The advocacy in support of the federal government in criminal cases
before the Court is thus consistently of the highest quality. Of course, many
criminal cases involve states, not the federal government, as parties. But
there, too, prosecution-side interests usually enjoy top-ﬂight counsel. In
recent decades, a number of states have created solicitor general oﬃces
modeled on the federal oﬃce. As Richard Lazarus explains, these states hired
“highly credentialed attorneys, often former clerks to U.S. Supreme Court
Justices” who “are quickly developing their own expertise in High Court
129 Michael R. Dreeben, The Role of the Solicitor General in the Department of Justice’s Appellate
Process, 61 U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL., Jan. 2013, at 5, 5.
130 See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 127, at 1335 (“Overall, the Solicitor General’s winning
percentage is 60-70% (as opposed to the 50% win rate for all litigants).”); see also Ryan C. Black &
Ryan J. Owens, A Built-In Advantage: The Oﬃce of the Solicitor General and the U.S. Supreme Court, 66
POL. RES. Q. 454, 461 (2013) (ﬁnding that OSG attorneys have “a 10% higher chance of winning”
exclusively because they are part of the OSG).
131 See Black & Owens, supra note 130, at 454-55.
132 Crespo, supra note 3, at 2014-15.
133 Id. at 2015.
134 See, e.g., Donald B. Verrilli, Michael Dreeben: A True Public Servant, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug.
2, 2019, 3:48 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/08/michael-dreeben-a-true-public-servant
[https://perma.cc/3HBW-GDF6] (describing Dreeben’s “awe-inspiring performances” in Supreme
Court oral argument, made possible by his ability to “underst[and] the relevant legal materials at
the deepest and most detailed level; . . . grasp[] every nuance and diﬃculty of the government’s
position; and . . . distill[] his key points to their crystalline essence”).
135 Id.
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advocacy.”136 These oﬃces pay dividends for the states that have created them;
one study concluded that “states are more likely to win when they utilize
attorneys from a formal state [solicitor general oﬃce], even after accounting
for the general levels of institutional resources that vary across states.”137
Even in the occasional instance where a state is not represented by skilled
counsel in the Court, government interests still ﬁnd able representation. That
is because the federal Solicitor General routinely participates in brieﬁng and
oral argument as an amicus curiae in support of state prosecutors.138 The
Solicitor General can thus protect prosecution interests even if a state
happens to drop the ball. More often, though, there are two able attorneys
arguing in favor of the government.
Criminal defendants, by contrast, are less consistently represented by the
most experienced and able practitioners. The reason, we think, is partly
institutional. While many criminal defendants have government-provided
lawyers—such as public defenders—there is no centralized public-defender
oﬃce that provides Supreme Court representation.139 Instead, defendants are
often represented by the attorneys who represented them in the lower
courts,140 who are very rarely Supreme Court experts. In fact, criminal
defendants’ lawyers are often arguing at the Court for the ﬁrst (and likely
only) time in their careers.
These lawyers could, of course, hand oﬀ their arguments to more
experienced practitioners. Some leading Supreme Court practitioners—most
notably Professor Jeﬀrey Fisher, of Stanford Law School’s Supreme Court
136 Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the
Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1501 (2008).
137 Ryan J. Owens & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, State Solicitors General, Appellate Expertise, and State
Success Before the U.S. Supreme Court, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 657, 658 (2014).
138 See Crespo, supra note 3, at 2013 (finding that the federal Office of the Solicitor General
participates, either as counsel for a party or as amicus, in seventy-two percent of criminal cases
before the Supreme Court—and in those cases, “virtually always argues in opposition to the
criminal defendant”). For a thorough and impressive study of amicus participation by the Office
of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court oral argument, see Darcy Covert & A.J. Wang, The
Loudest Voice at the Supreme Court: The Solicitor General’s Dominance of Amicus Oral Argument (Apr. 21,
2020), VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3446919 [https://perma.cc/SN8BM6R5].
139 The nearest analogue we are aware of is the Defender Supreme Court Resource &
Assistance Panel (DSCRAP). As the Defender Services Oﬃce’s website explains, DSCRAP “brings
together defenders from across the country who have expertise and practical experience on the
particular issues of federal criminal law that come before the Court,” but does not itself provide
representation. See Supreme Court Advocacy Assistance, DEFENDER SERVICES OFFICE: TRAINING
DIVISION, https://www.fd.org/supreme-court-advocacy-assistance [https://perma.cc/LTS3-J5X4]
(last visited Mar. 25, 2020).
140 See Harris, supra note 2 (quoting Justice Kagan as stating, “Every time one of these
[criminal] cases comes to the court where the trial lawyer . . . is doing their ﬁrst Supreme Court
argument without thinking about the court, . . . rather than giving over one of these cases to an
experienced Supreme Court bar member, that’s when I get a little upset”).
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Litigation Clinic, which he codirects with Professor Pamela Karlan—have
had great success representing criminal defendants before the Court pro
bono.141 But many inexperienced lawyers representing criminal defendants
seem unwilling to cede ground to more experienced counsel.142 There are
many possible explanations. Some may be opposed to the increasingly elite
nature of the Supreme Court bar.143 Others may not be aware of the
specialized nature of Supreme Court practice, or they may be overconﬁdent
in their own abilities.144 Personal incentives, too, may play a role; Supreme
Court oral arguments are rare honors for attorneys, and attorneys may
convince themselves they are right for the job out of self-interested motives.
In addition, criminal defendants themselves may be unaware of the existence
of a specialized Supreme Court bar that is eager to provide free representation
at the Court, and thus may not seek out more experienced counsel.
Whatever the precise explanation for why nonexpert criminal lawyers
retain cases at the Supreme Court, it has led to a significant representational
imbalance. Many close observers of the Supreme Court have taken note—
including at least two current Justices. Bemoaning criminal defense lawyers
who insisted on keeping their cases, Justice Sotomayor remarked, “I think
it’s malpractice for any lawyer who thinks this is my one shot before the
Supreme Court and I have to take it.”145 Justice Kagan oﬀered similar
observations:
I think that the litigants who are underserved in terms of lawyering quality
are criminal defendants . . . . Every time one of these cases comes to the court
where the trial lawyer—and the person may be a terriﬁc trial lawyer—is doing
their ﬁrst Supreme Court argument without thinking about the court,
without thinking about the way it operates, rather than giving over one of
these cases to an experienced Supreme Court bar member, that’s when I get
a little upset.146

As expert Supreme Court litigator (and former OSG lawyer) Roy Englert
described the problem, “There is a real injustice . . . . There are often two
We discuss Fisher and the Stanford clinic infra in subsection II.C.1.
See Kinder, supra note 3, at 253-55 (citing instances where criminal defense attorneys,
“famously noncomformist,” rejected assistance from Supreme Court specialists).
143 For a brief history tracing the development of the modern elite Supreme Court bar, see
Lazarus, supra note 136, at 1491-93, 1497-1502.
144 See Tony Mauro, Will Defense Lawyers Accept Help on High Court Criminal Cases?, LEGAL
TIMES (May 12, 2006), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rlazarus/docs/media/Will%20Defense
%20Lawyers%20Legal%20Times%202006.pdf [https://perma.cc/92GR-Z4AP] (suggesting that “solo
newbies” of “the criminal defense bar” believe “that if they can conquer a hometown jury, they can
work the same charm on the nine justices of the nation’s highest court”).
145 Roberts, Biskupic & Shiﬀman, supra note 2 (quotation marks omitted).
146 Harris, supra note 2 (quotation marks omitted).
141
142
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experienced oral advocates on the prosecution side and one oral advocate—
usually not an appellate specialist, and usually presenting his or her ﬁrst
Supreme Court argument—on the defense side.”147
Scholars have conﬁrmed these observers’ impressions. Crespo’s empirical
analysis of oral arguments during the Roberts Court concluded that “criminal
defendants are almost never represented by expert counsel in arguments before
the Supreme Court.”148 In his analysis, two thirds of lawyers representing
criminal defendants were Supreme Court novices—a significantly higher
percentage than seen in civil cases before the Court.149 A study by William
Kinder, considering a smaller slice of Roberts Court cases, similarly
concluded that criminal defendants were far more likely to have
inexperienced Supreme Court counsel than other litigants.150
To be sure, experience is only a proxy for attorney quality. Even the
greatest Supreme Court advocate had a ﬁrst argument. And there is no doubt
that some of those ﬁrst-time advocates did an excellent job. Nonetheless,
given that the Justices “have increasingly come to rely on and expect expert
advocacy,”151 there is reason to believe that some of those inexperienced
attorneys are not serving their clients as eﬀectively as a seasoned expert like
Jeﬀ Fisher could.
Moreover, there is some evidence that at the Supreme Court, experience
matters. A recent empirical analysis by Michael Nelson and Lee Epstein
concluded that “on average, attorneys with experience, relative to ﬁrst-timers,
are signiﬁcantly more likely to win their cases and attract the votes of
justices.”152 This ﬁnding is surprising for those who think that judicial
ideology is the sole determinant of Supreme Court decisionmaking. Although
more empirical evidence would be useful, this ﬁnding is consistent with the
common-sense idea that litigating in the Supreme Court is a specialized skill,
which, like all specialized skills, improves with practice.153 And Nelson and
Epstein’s ﬁnding is strong evidence that factors unrelated to the underlying
147 Mauro, supra note 144 (quotation marks omitted). Another Supreme Court expert, former
Assistant to the Solicitor General Beth Brinkmann, has oﬀered similar remarks: “The criminal
defense bar has not been traditionally well-organized or represented in the Supreme Court.
Sometimes it’s pretty dismal, other times it’s outstanding.” The Rise of Appellate Litigators and State
Solicitors General, 29 REV. LITIG. 545, 561 (2010).
148 Crespo, supra note 3, at 2007.
149 Id. at 2008.
150 Kinder, supra note 3, at 232.
151 Crespo, supra note 3, at 2007.
152 Michael J. Nelson & Lee Epstein, Lawyers with More Experience Obtain Better Outcomes
2 (unpublished manuscript), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/DoAttorneysMatterPaper.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YQ44-Q4VH].
153 See David J. Bederman, A Chilly Reception at the Court, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 51, 59
(2003) (“In the unique arena of Supreme Court advocacy, the key ingredient of success can often be
the lawyer’s level of experience and comfort.”).
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legal merits of a case can aﬀect the results of particular Supreme Court
rulings. Over time, if an advocacy gap causes one side to lose more often than
it would otherwise, we should expect that diﬀerential to change the shape of
legal doctrine as a whole.
To be sure, there is a worthwhile debate to be had about whether the
emergence of an elite Supreme Court bar is good for the Court or the
nation.154 That debate is for another day. Our point is that in a world with an
elite Supreme Court bar, criminal defendants with nonexpert counsel are at
a disadvantage. And because of the Court’s role as chief regulator of the
criminal justice system, that fact imposes substantial externalities on criminal
defendants more broadly. If there is going to be a rear-guard eﬀort to counter
the rise of elitism in the Supreme Court bar, it should not be at the expense
of criminal defendants.
3. Credibility
The problems do not end with defense lawyers’ relative lack of expertise
in Supreme Court criminal litigation. They also have less credibility, in the
Court’s eyes, than the prosecutors they face oﬀ against. That doesn’t mean, of
course, that the typical attorney representing a criminal defendant before the
Supreme Court has any less integrity than the typical prosecutor. Rather, it
is merely another symptom of an asymmetry noted above: that in criminal
litigation at the Supreme Court, the government is a repeat player, while
defendants are (usually) “one-shotters.”155
Beyond the opportunity to “play for the rule,” repeat-player status also
confers credibility on a litigant. This is because, as Galanter explains, a repeat
player “must establish and maintain credibility as a combatant.”156 Repeat
players have a powerful incentive not to make false or dubious assertions.
Because the stakes of any given case are low, they can prioritize building and
preserving their credibility over winning the immediate dispute.157 And
importantly, decisionmakers—Supreme Court Justices—know that repeat
players’ assertions are constrained by their need to maintain credibility,
meaning that the decisionmaker can justiﬁably rely on them. Not so the
assertions of one-shotters, whose perspective is limited to the particular case.
154 For an introduction to this debate, see Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Capture at the High Court,
119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 89 (2010).
155 Galanter, supra note 53, at 97; see also supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
156 Galanter, supra note 53, at 99.
157 See REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 31
(1992) (“[T]he government is more interested in the long-term development of the law and rules
than in the immediate success of a particular case.”); Galanter, supra note 53, at 99 (“The [repeat
player] must establish and maintain credibility as a combatant. His interest in his ‘bargaining
reputation’ serves as a resource to establish ‘commitment’ to his bargaining positions.”).
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If a one-shotter is caught making a false assertion, that may hurt her chances
of prevailing in the pending case, but the bad consequences end there.
Rational decisionmakers know this too, and they are, again justiﬁably, more
skeptical of the one-shotters’ claims.158
If anything, the usual advantage that repeat players have over one-shotters
in litigation is magniﬁed in criminal litigation at the Supreme Court. Not
only are defendants one-shot litigants, but their lawyers usually are too.159 As
noted above, Crespo found that two-thirds of the arguments on behalf of
criminal defendants were by Supreme Court “novices,” which he deﬁned as
“attorneys who presented only one argument to the Court over the span of
the [ﬁrst decade of the Roberts Court] and who were not already established
experts when the decade began.”160 While it is possible that some of these
arguments marked the beginning of a lawyer’s career as a Supreme Court
advocate, for most of these lawyers, the argument was their one and only time
before the Court.161 There is every reason to expect that these advocates’
objective in the Supreme Court was to win the case at hand, not to build a
reputation with the Justices for future cases. That is as it should be,162 but
there is a credibility downside. Ordinarily, even when a party is a one-shotter,

158 See Galanter, supra note 53, at 99 (“With no bargaining reputation to maintain, the [oneshotter] has more diﬃculty in convincingly committing himself in bargaining.”).
159 It is extremely uncommon for any particular defendant to appear before the Court in more
than one case. Cf. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 322 F. Supp. 375, 376 (D. Or. 1971) (“It is rare
indeed for a party to be twice successful in petitioning for certiorari and twice successful in
convincing the Supreme Court that its position should be adopted.”), modified sub nom. Perkins
v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 474 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1973), supplemented by 487 F.2d 672 (9th
Cir. 1973). For exceptions, see generally Jason Iuliano & Ya Sheng Lin, Supreme Court Repeaters, 69
VAND. L. REV. 1349 (2016).
160 Crespo, supra note 3, at 2008.
161 See id. at 2008 n.78 (hypothesizing as such). Indeed, the one-shot nature of much criminal
advocacy in the Supreme Court can lead to unethical conduct. Jeﬀrey Fisher recounts a telephone
conversation he had with an attorney whose client had prevailed in a state supreme court. Jeﬀrey L.
Fisher, A Clinic’s Place in the Supreme Court Bar, 65 STAN. L. REV. 137, 178 (2013). Fisher noted that
it was a “shame” that the state court had not ruled for the lawyer’s client on state constitutional
grounds. Id. The lawyer explained that he “purposely refrained from raising the state constitution
so that if [he] won in the state supreme court, [he] could get a U.S. Supreme Court argument.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted).
162 An individual criminal defense lawyer’s interest is supposed to be winning the case on their
client’s behalf. The defendant’s interest and the one-shot Supreme Court defense lawyer’s interests,
moreover, are not out of sync. A Supreme Court win, after all, can be a powerful marketing tool
when a lawyer returns to ordinary practice. Indeed, just appearing in the Supreme Court can be
used to generate business. Utah attorney Michael Studebaker argued the losing side of Brigham City
v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006). His merits brief, Tony Mauro wrote in Legal Times, “raised eyebrows,”
though his performance at oral argument was “not as bad as some had feared.” Mauro, supra note
144. To this day, Studebaker’s Avvo proﬁle leads with “I have aruged [sic] before the US Supreme
Court.” See Michael P Studebaker, AVVO, https://www.avvo.com/attorneys/84401-ut-michaelstudebaker-4467782.html [https://perma.cc/X9MX-Y2XF] (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).
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her lawyer is a repeat player,163 and that oﬀsets some of the one-shotter’s
disadvantages in litigating against a repeat player. Not so in much Supreme
Court criminal litigation.
Even beyond the ordinary litigation dynamics of repeat players and oneshotters, the credibility gap between prosecutors and (typical) defense
lawyers in Supreme Court litigation is accentuated by the unique position of
the Solicitor General. Sometimes (though controversially) called the “Tenth
Justice,”164 the Solicitor General’s access to the Justices exceeds that of
ordinary litigants.165 At the most tangible level, the Solicitor General has an
oﬃce in the Supreme Court building.166 More substantively, the OSG’s
frequent appearances before the Court builds rapport between the Justices
and members of the Oﬃce.167 Informally too, the Solicitor General and
lawyers working under him or her have historically been invited to social
gatherings of the Justices and law clerks to which “ordinary” Supreme Court
advocates were not.168 All this contributes to the OSG’s credibility advantage
over its criminal law adversaries.
This credibility is not simply a byproduct of the OSG’s work; it is the
result of a carefully cultivated strategy. As former Deputy Solicitor General
Michael Dreeben has explained, the Solicitor General’s Oﬃce “strives to have
credibility before the Court by ensuring that its arguments have legal and
factual integrity on the pros and cons of a position.”169 This goal helps make
some sense of the Solicitor General’s practice of confessing error in cases in
which the government prevailed below (at least in cases, unlike Shelton, where

See Galanter, supra note 53, at 114.
See, e.g., CAPLAN, supra note 74; see also David A. Strauss, The Solicitor General and the
Interests of the United States, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 168 (1998) (describing, as “one of the
most commonly held views” of the Solicitor General, “that the Solicitor General is not merely an
oﬃcial of the Executive Branch but someone who has special responsibilities to the Supreme
Court—in some ways, a ‘tenth Justice’”). But see Kevin T. McGuire, Explaining Executive Success in
the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 505, 505-06 (1998) (rejecting the “Tenth Justice” hypothesis
as empirically unfounded).
165 See CAPLAN, supra note 74, at 19 (“The relationship between the Supreme Court and the
SG’s oﬃce has long been more intimate than anyone at either place likes to acknowledge.”).
166 About the Court: Building Features, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., www.supremecourt.gov/about/
buildingfeatures.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZA27-HFVW] (last visited Apr. 1, 2020).
167 See Crespo, supra note 3, at 2015 (noting OSG’s “cachet with the Court”); Lazarus, supra
note 136, at 1497 (characterizing OSG as “completely familiar with the Justices and their precedent”).
168 See, e.g., CAPLAN, supra note 74, at 19-20 (describing personal contacts between Solicitors
General and the Justices, as well as those between members of the Solicitor General’s staﬀ and the
Justices, and noting one Justice’s comment that these contacts “should make the hair stand up on the
backs of the necks of private attorneys when they hear about [them]”).
169 Dreeben, supra note 129, at 7.
163
164
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the Solicitor General isn’t trying to dodge an issue).170 Lawyers from the
Solicitor General’s Oﬃce tend to explain this practice using lofty language
about legal ethics and the government’s special duty to do justice.171 However,
the real explanation likely involves a great deal of rational self-interest. As
Thomas Merrill argues, confessions of error and similar practices “enhance the
Solicitor General’s reputation with the Justices for being an ‘honest broker’ or
a ‘straight shooter.’ Having such a reputation undoubtedly increases the degree
of overall deference that the Court gives the Solicitor General . . . .”172 This
practice seems particularly important in the criminal context, as “[t]he vast
majority of confessions of error occur in criminal cases.”173
The Solicitor General works hard to maintain credibility because it
matters—in a number of ways. Credibility matters ﬁrst at the agenda-setting
stage. The ﬁrst challenge for a litigant with a certiorari-worthy issue is to get
the Court to notice his petition, one of the thousands that will be ﬁled each
year.174 Consider the Solicitor General’s success in getting the Court to grant
its petitions. Lazarus observes that grant rate for petitions ﬁled by the
Solicitor General—around seventy percent—is “several orders of magnitude”
higher than the three- to four-percent rate for ordinary paid litigants.175
Though the Solicitor General’s high grant rate can partially be explained by
considerations of brief quality and interbranch comity,176 the OSG’s
credibility as a repeat player likely contributes as well.177 Credibility also
170 See Neal Kumar Katyal, The Solicitor General and Confession of Error, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
3027, 3030 (2013) (noting that over the last century-plus, “all Solicitors General . . . have confessed
error, roughly at the pace of two or three times per Supreme Court term”).
171 See, e.g., id. at 3029-30 (“To me there is no greater institution that shows really what true
legal ethics is about than the confession-of-error practice by the Solicitor General.”); see also
Dreeben, supra note 129, at 10 (discussing confessions of error in terms of concerns about convicting
the innocent and “miscarriage[s] of justice”).
172 Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, “Tenured” Lawyers, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 97 (1998).
173 David M. Rosenzweig, Confession of Error in the Supreme Court by the Solicitor General, 82
GEO. L.J. 2079, 2080-81 (1994).
174 See Epps & Ortman, supra note 39, at 713 (“From approximately 7,000-8,000 certiorari
petitions every year, the Court grants review in fewer than ninety . . . .”).
175 Lazarus, supra note 136, at 1493.
176 See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 127, at 1338 (“[T]he Solicitor General . . . represents a
branch of government, and although the two branches serve as a check on one another, they
nonetheless have common institutional interests.”); Lazarus, supra note 136, at 1493 (“The Court
plainly provides the Solicitor General’s legal arguments with heightened respect because of the
nature of his client—the United States—and the deference that the judicial branch naturally
owes . . . to the views of counsel representing the interests of the two other branches of
government.”); James L. Cooper, Note, The Solicitor General and the Evolution of Activism, 65 IND.
L.J. 675, 684 (1990) (noting that “[t]he general quality of the government’s legal work” and the
fact that “[t]he Court has historically found the Solicitor General’s advice to be helpful” make the
Court more willing to grant government petitions).
177 Lazarus explains that the Solicitor General’s Oﬃce ﬁles certiorari petitions only after
carefully scrutinizing an issue for its cert-worthiness, and posits that its certiorari-stage success ﬂows
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appears to matter for non-government certiorari petitions. Lazarus notes that
expert Supreme Court litigators can claim grant rates as high as twenty
percent.178 Though the high quality of their work product obviously plays a
role, so does their credibility in the eyes of the Justices and their clerks. When
law clerks “see the name of an attorney whose work before the Court they
know,” Lazarus explains, “that attorney’s involvement in the case, by itself,
conveys an important message about the signiﬁcance of the legal issues being
presented and the credibility of the assertions being made.”179
Credibility also matters at the merits stage of litigation, though perhaps
not as much.180 Credibility may be less important when it comes to the
Court’s evaluation of a litigant’s normative view of what legal rule the Court
should adopt or how a case should come out.181 That’s because litigants—and
their lawyers—are for obvious reasons not neutrals with respect to how the
Court rules in their cases, though a particularly credible advocate might have
some persuasive force in characterizing the best reading of the Court’s prior
cases. But a lawyer’s credibility is critical when she attempts to convince the
Court to adopt her view of a “legislative fact”—a fact about the world beyond
the case.182 Such facts are often crucial inputs to Supreme Court

in part from the fact that the Court is “aware of the kind of judgment exercised by the Solicitor
General in deciding which cases warrant the Court’s review.” Lazarus, supra note 136, at 1495-96; see
also Cordray & Cordray, supra note 127, at 1337 (“The Solicitor General’s established reputation and
enhanced credibility cause justices and their clerks to rely heavily on the Solicitor General’s briefs.”);
Fisher, supra note 161, at 169 (“One reason the Solicitor General’s oﬃce enjoys such a high rate of
success in its certiorari practice is because the Court knows that it generally refuses to ﬁle a certiorari
petition unless it genuinely believes that certiorari should be granted.”). Some commentators believe
that the Solicitor General is too stingy in authorizing certiorari petitions. See, e.g., Adam D.
Chandler, Comment, Solicitor General of the United States: Tenth Justice or Zealous Advocate?, 121 YALE
L.J. 725, 725 (2011) (arguing “that the Solicitor General should behave more zealously in his advocacy
at the petition stage, which will almost certainly require him to ﬁle more cert. petitions each year”).
The Solicitor General’s inﬂuence on the Court’s agenda setting appears greatest, moreover, in cases
where the Court asks the Solicitor General to weigh in on whether it should grant certiorari. Lazarus
reports that in these instances, “almost every time the Court follows the Solicitor General’s advice.”
Lazarus, supra note 136, at 1494.
178 Lazarus, supra note 136, at 1527.
179 Id. at 1526.
180 See Fisher, supra note 161, at 162 (“I think it is safe to say that whatever the precise statistical
advantage on the merits is, Supreme Court specialists provide a greater comparative advantage at
the certiorari stage, when familiarity with the Court and credibility of counsel is even more
important.” (footnote omitted)).
181 Hence, discussing the Solicitor General’s inﬂuence on the Court in federalism cases, former
Solicitor General Seth Waxman observed that “it’s pellucidly clear that the bottom-line views of the
United States as to the appropriate balance between national and state power are uniquely
unimportant to the Court.” Waxman, supra note 71, at 1119.
182 See id. (“[A]ny court must be concerned with the real-world consequences of doctrinal
change. And in this respect I think the views of the United States do retain signiﬁcance.”).
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decisionmaking,183 yet the Justices have neither the opportunity nor the
competence to verify propositions of legislative fact propounded by parties
or amici.184 In this informational vacuum, the credibility of counsel for the
parties and their amici loom large.185 The prosecution’s credibility advantage
in Supreme Court criminal litigation makes it likely—indeed inevitable—
that the Justices’ background understanding of the realities of the criminal
justice system will tilt in the prosecution’s favor.
C. Previous Proposals
We are not the ﬁrst to recognize that institutional reform is required to
address asymmetrical representation in Supreme Court criminal litigation.
In recent years, Professor Andrew Crespo and Senator Cory Booker have
both proposed new institutions targeting the problem. Crespo argued that
the Court should organize a “standing committee” of its bar, whose members
would appear as amici curiae in criminal cases.186 Senator Booker introduced
legislation in 2016 to create a “Defender Oﬃce for Supreme Court Advocacy”
(the “Defender Office”), whose attorneys would be available to represent
criminal defendants in noncapital cases at the Court.187 These are good
proposals that would achieve some of the advantages of the Office of the
Defender General developed in Part II, though neither would attain them all.188
Consider ﬁrst Crespo’s standing committee. Crespo argues that the
Supreme Court should “consider formally empowering such a committee to
select an attorney to argue as amicus curiae in any case in which the Oﬃce of
the Solicitor General will present argument against a criminal defendant.”189
183 See Larsen, supra note 38, at 1759 (“Supreme Court decisions today frequently turn on
questions of so-called ‘legislative fact’—generalized facts about the world that are not limited to any
speciﬁc case.”).
184 See id. at 1805 (discussing the institutional features that position administrative agencies to
“process legislative facts,” including subject-matter expertise, and concluding that “[j]udges cannot
provide this same expertise”).
185 In at least two instances in recent years, the Solicitor General’s Oﬃce has sent letters to the
Court to “correct” factual errors in its brieﬁng. See Regina Jeﬀeries, Tragedy of Errors: The Solicitor
General, the Supreme Court and the Truth, JUST SECURITY (May 23, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/
56718/tragedy-errors-solicitor-general-supreme-court-truth [https://perma.cc/YD5Y-E9HF]
(describing correction letters regarding Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009), and Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510 (2003)). In each case, the Court had relied on the Solicitor General’s error in its opinion. Id.
186 See Crespo, supra note 3, at 2026-30.
187 See Clarence Gideon Full Access to Justice Act, S. 3145, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016).
188 Additionally, some have suggested that existing institutions, such as the elite Supreme
Court bar or the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, could “step up” to close the
advocacy gap. See, e.g., Kinder, supra note 3, at 229 (arguing that “to close [the] advocacy gap, more
criminal defense attorneys should accept assistance from Supreme Court specialists once a case
reaches the merits stage of Supreme Court litigation”). We consider this possibility below in
Section II.C.
189 Crespo, supra note 3, at 2026-27.

1504

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1469

Crespo reckons, and we agree, that a committee of this sort would “attract top
ﬂight talent to its ranks.”190 He further contends that arguments presented by
these lawyers would “likely go a long way toward closing the advocacy gap in
the Court’s criminal docket.”191 Again, we agree, but Crespo’s solution doesn’t
solve the entire problem of asymmetrical Supreme Court representation. It
would alleviate the quality gap between prosecutors and criminal defense
lawyers at the Supreme Court, but that is not enough to level the playing
ﬁeld. Most importantly, Crespo envisions that a standing committee member
will present argument (as amici) in support of a criminal defendant whose case
appears before the Court. He does not suggest that members of the committee
would represent the interest of criminal defendants as a class. Nor should
attorneys drawn from the ranks of the private law firms attempt to represent
criminal defendants as a class.192 Unlike our Defender General, such attorneys
lack either the perspective or accountability that is required to speak on behalf
of criminal defendants collectively.193 Crespo’s proposal is also limited in that
the standing committee’s work would begin when the Court grants certiorari.
Unlike the Defender General, then, it could not remedy representational
inequalities between prosecutors and defendants at the certiorari stage.
Senator Booker’s proposal is closer to ours than Crespo’s. Booker’s bill
would have created the Defender Oﬃce as a nonproﬁt corporation headed by
a director and supervised by a board drawn in equal parts from federal
defender organizations, Criminal Justice Act (CJA) panel attorneys, and state
and local public defenders.194 The legislation envisioned that the Defender
Oﬃce would give ﬁrst priority to indigent defendants, but that it could
represent or assist non-indigent defendants in the Supreme Court as resources
permitted.195 The bill further empowered the Defender Office to appear as
amicus in any criminal case at the Supreme Court or in any state high court

Id. at 2027.
Id. at 2027-28.
Crespo envisions that the standing committee would include members “from the academy,
from established criminal defense organizations, and from the elite Supreme Court Bar.” Id. at 2027.
193 Crespo’s proposal, moreover, would narrow but not eliminate the credibility gap between
the Solicitor General’s Office and criminal defense attorneys in the Supreme Court. See supra
subsection I.B.3. It would narrow it because the individual attorneys selected by the standing
committee to appear before the Court would likely be repeat players themselves, with reputational
interests to protect. We think it unlikely, however, that the credibility of individual lawyers could
ever match the institutional credibility that the Office of the Solicitor General has accumulated
over the decades. The Oﬃce of the Defender General, on the other hand, could, though that will
take time. See infra Part II.
194 Clarence Gideon Full Access to Justice Act, S. 3145, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016). Senator Booker
reintroduced the legislation in the 115th Congress. See Clarence Gideon Full Access to Justice Act,
S. 330, 115th Cong. (2017).
195 S. 3145, § 2.
190
191
192
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criminal case that implicated a question of federal law.196 And it could even
file certiorari petitions on behalf of individual criminal defendants.197
There is much common ground between Senator Booker’s Defender
Oﬃce and our proposal, as will become clear shortly.198 But because Booker’s
proposal languished in the Senate and died without even a hearing,199 there
remains much to say about it. There are, moreover, important diﬀerences
between Senator Booker’s Defender Oﬃce and our Defender General. One
is that Booker’s proposal was specifically geared at remedying representational
gaps at the Supreme Court between indigent defendants and prosecutors.200
We do not distinguish between indigent and non-indigent defendants,
because we believe that there is an advocacy gap at the Supreme Court no
matter whether the defense lawyer is a federal defender, a CJA panel attorney,
or a private lawyer.201 But the most important difference between the proposals
is that, unlike the Defender General, Booker’s Defender Office retains the
traditional assumption of a lawyer representing a single client. While the
Defender Oﬃce’s work would likely give it visibility into the interests of
criminal defendants collectively, whenever the interests of an individual
defendant and the interests of criminal defendants in general diverged—as
they inevitably would202—Booker’s Defender Oﬃce, unlike our Defender
General, would be duty-bound to represent the individual’s interests. It would
thus leave in place the asymmetry in Supreme Court cases between the
Solicitor General’s uniﬁed voice and the dispersed, sometimes conﬂicting
perspectives of individual defendants.203
Id.
Id.
See infra Part II.
See All Actions: S. 3145—114th Congress (2015-2016), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/
bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/3145/committees [https://perma.cc/C5LP-6MY2] (last visited
Apr. 2, 2020). Perhaps it would have succeeded with a fully theorized 27,000-word law review article
backing it up. We like to think so.
200 Booker made this priority clear when he introduced the bill on the Senate ﬂoor. See 162
CONG. REC. S4917 (daily ed. July 7, 2016) (statement of Sen. Booker) (“To ﬁll in those gaps in the
highest court of our land and better balance the scales of justice between the government and the
defendants, the Gideon Act would establish an independent federal public defender oﬃce charged
with representing poor defendants before the United States Supreme Court.”).
201 Indeed, because of the availability of help from the federal Defender Services Oﬃce’s
Supreme Court Advocacy Assistance program for federal defenders and panel attorneys, it is not
hard to imagine that indigents represented by those attorneys fare better at the Supreme Court than
defendants represented by non-expert private lawyers. See supra note 139.
202 See infra subsection II.A.1.
203 The title “Defender General” is also not new to us, though we appear to be the ﬁrst to
suggest a Defender General’s Oﬃce speciﬁcally designed as the Supreme Court counterpart to the
Solicitor General in criminal cases. Previously, the title has been used to designate the chief public
defender of a jurisdiction. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5251 (2019) (creating the “Oﬃce of Defender
General” to head public defense in Vermont); S. REP. NO. 91-790, at 18 (1970) (“The [Senate
Judiciary] committee recognizes the desirability of eventual creation of a strong, independent oﬃce
196
197
198
199
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II. THE PROPOSAL
This Part develops our proposed solution to the problem of asymmetrical
representation in criminal litigation at the Supreme Court. Section II.A
explores how, at an operational level, the Oﬃce of the Defender General
would provide expert, credible counsel to represent the interests of criminal
defendants collectively. Section II.B then considers two important
implementation questions—how the Defender General would be selected and
held accountable, and how her oﬃce would be staﬀed. Finally, Section II.C
addresses several potential objections to the proposal.
A. The Proposal and Its Benefits
We propose the creation of a new federal agency, the Office of the
Defender General, with the mission of conducting criminal litigation in the
United States Supreme Court on behalf of the interests of criminal defendants
as a collective class. The Office would be headed by a senior official, the
to administer the Federal defender program. It considered as a possibility the immediate
establishment of a new, independent oﬃcial—a ‘Defender General of the United States.’”); MODEL
PUB. DEF. ACT § 10 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1970) (creating an Oﬃce of the Defender General,
headed by an appointed “Defender General” who has “primary responsibility for providing needy
persons with legal services”). A few scholars, moreover, have suggested that a federal “Defender
General” could serve as a kind of political counterweight to the Attorney General. See Kenneth B.
Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial Criminal Process—A Critique of
the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal for Reform, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 817 (1995) (“In
order to balance the government’s symbolic relationship to the criminal justice system, I would
propose the creation of a ‘Defender General’ at the federal level. Like the Attorney General, the
federal Defender General would also be a high government oﬃcial, although not necessarily a
member of the President’s Cabinet.”); Andrea D. Lyon, Dean’s Desk: The United States Needs a
Defender General, IND. LAW. (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/41749deans-desk-the-united-states-needs-a-defender-general [https://perma.cc/KBL9-7RMN] (arguing that
a “defender general should command the same respect and stature that the oﬃces of the attorney
general and solicitor general command” and use its inﬂuence to “ensure that all of those interested
in criminal justice have a seat at the table”). More recently, Matthew Segal of the ACLU of
Massachusetts published an opinion piece in Slate arguing that a Defender General could counter a
Department of Justice that is increasingly making “faulty,” politically motivated arguments in court.
Matthew R. Segal, The Census Case Shows Why We Need a Defender General, SLATE (June 27, 2019,
3:31 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/06/doj-noel-francisco-lies-census-case-supremecourt-defender-general.html [https://perma.cc/9KBD-NBZW]. Segal’s Defender General’s Oﬃce,
which would be more of a watchdog than a specialized Supreme Court advocate for criminal cases,
would call the Department of Justice to task when it stepped out of line. See id. Segal thus asks
rhetorically whether DOJ brass would send “a career lawyer to quibble with federal judges about
soap and blankets for detained kids if they had understood that a prestigious government-funded
law oﬃce was prepared to tell the court that the DOJ’s position was meritless?” Id. Segal’s argument
is premised on countering what we have called the Solicitor General’s credibility advantage. See
supra subsection I.B.3. Credibility is important, but like Senator Booker’s proposal (which Segal’s
op-ed notes), Segal’s Defender General does not aim to solve the fundamental asymmetry in
Supreme Court criminal litigation between the uniﬁed vision of prosecutors and the dispersed
interests of defendants.
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Defender General, and staffed with deputy and assistant defenders general. In
some cases, where the interests of a particular defendant were aligned with the
collective interests of defendants, the Defender General would appear before
the Court as defense counsel. In other cases, the Office would appear as amicus
in its own name, either to supplement the presentation of defense counsel, or,
when necessary, to oppose the defendant’s position.
This Section explores how the Defender General would go about
conducting Supreme Court litigation on behalf of the collective interests of
defendants. The Defender General’s purview would include both the Court’s
agenda-setting stage (that is, the certiorari docket) and the merits stage. We
consider each segment of the Oﬃce’s work in turn. We bracket until the next
Section all questions of how the Defender General will be selected, how her
oﬃce will be staﬀed, and how she will be held accountable.
Before we turn to the operational details, we must tackle one deﬁnitional
matter. We have said that the Defender General would conduct criminal
litigation in the Supreme Court. But what precisely is “criminal” litigation? In
other words, what is the subject-matter limitation on the Defender General’s
jurisdiction? In many cases, the criminal nature of litigation is uncontroversial.
Certainly, no one would doubt that a direct or collateral attack on a criminal
conviction constitutes criminal litigation. Nor would anyone suggest that a
government appeal of a criminal sentence is not criminal litigation. Other
sorts of cases may pose more difficult definitional problems. Is litigation about
prison conditions criminal? What about a civil lawsuit to enjoin enforcement
of a criminal statute on the grounds that it is void-for-vagueness under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments? While we do not have firmly settled views
about where the outer limits of “criminal” litigation fall, we believe that the
Defender General’s jurisdiction should include any matter in which criminal
defendants as a collective class have an identifiable interest.204
1. The Defender General’s Role in Certiorari
Though the Defender General’s work on merits cases will be more visible,
leveling the adversarial playing ﬁeld at the certiorari stage is at least as
204 A related question is whether the Defender General should be involved with constitutional
torts cases raising issues under, for instance, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. On the one hand,
these cases can obviously implicate legal doctrines that are of interest to criminal defendants. On
the other, civil plaintiﬀs in constitutional torts cases may have interests that diverge from the
interests of criminal defendants. Civil plaintiﬀs, for instance, may be inclined to press for remedial
schemes emphasizing monetary damages, while criminal defendants may be more interested in
exclusionary remedies. Given the opportunity for diverging interests, we doubt that it would be
appropriate for the Defender General to actually represent civil plaintiﬀs in constitutional tort cases
at the Court. That said, the Oﬃce might well make a practice of ﬁling amicus briefs on its own
behalf in such cases.
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important. As we explained above, the prosecution (via the Solicitor General)
currently enjoys an enormous advantage in shaping the Court’s docket.205 In
large part, that is because the Solicitor General can approach the Court’s
agenda strategically. When a legal question surfaces that warrants the
Supreme Court’s attention, the Solicitor General can sometimes fend oﬀ a
certiorari grant until a case arises that puts its position in the best-possible
light, even if that means absorbing short-term losses.206 Not so criminal
defendants, each of whom is separately represented and each of whom wants
relief in his case. The Defender General would fundamentally change that
dynamic, bringing the same strategic perspective to the defense side that the
Solicitor General gives the prosecution.
There’s a second reason why it is critical that the Defender General have
an active certiorari-stage practice. The Defender General’s eﬀectiveness in
representing the collective interest of criminal defendants requires that her
Oﬃce possess a working knowledge of the legal issues that confront
defendants broadly. The Oﬃce’s work on the Court’s merits cases alone will
not provide that broad outlook because, as we have explored elsewhere, the
Court’s merits docket is not representative of any broader universe of
litigation.207 The Oﬃce’s work on a wide array of certiorari-stage matters, on
the other hand, will give it a window into the legal issues confronting a large
number of defendants.
We envision that the Defender General’s certiorari-stage work will have
three main components: fielding requests for Supreme Court representation
from defendants,208 monitoring certiorari petitions in criminal cases, and
responding to “Calls for the View of the Defender General” (CVDGs)
from the Court.
First, the Defender General would entertain requests for representation
from defendants seeking or opposing Supreme Court review. The Oﬃce
would establish a system whereby defendants eligible to ﬁle certiorari
petitions—typically, this would be defendants who had lost in a federal
appellate court or a terminal state appeal—could ask the Oﬃce to take over
their case.209 Likewise, a prevailing defendant who received a certiorari
See supra notes 69–79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 111–122 and accompanying text.
Epps & Ortman, supra note 39, at 719-20.
For ease of exposition, we refer in the text to the Defender General’s potential clients as
“defendants.” As noted above, however, there may be instances in which the Defender General
represents a civil plaintiﬀ. See supra note 204.
209 We need not specify all the details of the application process here, but one is important.
The defendant (and his existing defense team) would be warned not to include any attorney-client
privileged materials in the application. This matters because, as we explain, the Defender General
could end up taking a position in the Supreme Court that is adverse to the defendant. See infra text
accompanying notes 227–230.
205
206
207
208
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petition ﬁled by a prosecutor could ask the Defender General to take
responsibility for opposing certiorari.
The Defender General (or, more realistically, her assistants and deputies)
would carefully screen these requests for representation. As the Solicitor
General does with requests for petitions submitted by federal agencies,210 the
Defender General would examine the case to determine whether it contains
any certiorari-worthy questions of law. The Defender General’s credibility
with the Court, of course, would depend in part on whether the Court comes
to see the Oﬃce’s petitions as dependable. We suspect that the vast majority
of requests would be eliminated on the grounds that there is no legal question
plausibly warranting the Court’s review. For those cases that have a plausible
issue, the Defender General would evaluate whether the defendant’s interests
align with the interests of defendants as a class. That inquiry has both
substantive and strategic considerations. Substantively, the Defender General
must determine whether the ruling the defendant would seek from the Court
would work to the beneﬁt of defendants as a class. Strategically, the Defender
General would consider whether the factual and procedural details of this
defendant’s case maximize the chances of a favorable ruling from the Court on
the legal question. If another case “in the certiorari pipeline”211 (or expected
to be there soon) raises the same question of law in a more auspicious context,
the Defender General would work to promote a grant in that case instead.
When the Defender General declines a case, the defendant would be free
to use other counsel to ﬁle a certiorari petition, or, more rarely, a brief in
opposition to a government petition, on his own. But when the Defender
General determines that representing a defendant at the certiorari stage is in
the Oﬃce’s interest, the Defender General could assume responsibility as
lead counsel.212 The defendant would then get free Supreme Court
representation of the highest caliber (which is the inducement for defendants
to approach the Defender General’s Oﬃce in the ﬁrst place). The Defender
General’s obligation would be to represent the defendant zealously—as long
as doing so advanced the interests of defendants. This arrangement might
seem to present ethical quandaries, given the Defender General’s ultimate
obligation to protect defendants generally. But it is one that government
lawyers encounter regularly; when federal law enforcement oﬃcers are sued
in their individual capacities under Bivens, the Department of Justice has

See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
See Fisher, supra note 161, at 184 (“It thus becomes important to litigants, if there are
multiple cases in the certiorari pipeline that present a common legal issue, that the case the Court
chooses to decide the issue puts the litigants’ best foot forward.”).
212 Presumptively, in such cases the Oﬃce would continue to represent the defendant at the
merits stage if the case is granted.
210
211
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discretion to represent the defendant when doing so is in the interests of the
United States.213
The second component of the Defender General’s certiorari-stage work
would be monitoring criminal certiorari petitions not ﬁled by the Oﬃce. The
purpose of this review—aside from helping the Oﬃce keep abreast of
criminal law issues aﬀecting defendants—would be to identify cases in which
a certiorari-stage amicus brief from the Oﬃce would be appropriate. There
are several scenarios in which such a ﬁling could further the Oﬃce’s mission.
Where a defendant ﬁles a petition in a case that the Oﬃce believes warrants
the Court’s review, the Oﬃce could ﬁle a brief supporting the petition. To
the extent that the Defender General is seen by the Court as a reliable judge
of a case’s worthiness, her support could help the petition get picked out of
the pile. This could prove particularly valuable where the defendant’s petition
was not written by an expert Supreme Court lawyer. In other cases, the Oﬃce
may determine that although a defendant’s petition poses a plausibly
certiorari-worthy legal question, Supreme Court review is likely to end badly
for the interests of criminal defendants.214 In these cases, if there are grounds
to oppose certiorari, the Oﬃce could ﬁle an amicus brief doing so.
The Defender General could also participate as certiorari-stage amicus
where a prosecutor (the Solicitor General or a state official) filed the
petition. Obviously, the Defender General would oppose certiorari in these
cases where, in the Office’s view, certiorari was not warranted, and support
certiorari where it was. The Office might also conclude in a “state-on-top”
case that there was a legal error below, but that the Court would likely create
bad precedent for defendants if it granted full review.215 In such a case, if the
Office thought a grant likely, it might file an amicus brief with a
“suggestion of error”—analogous to a “confession of error” by the Solicitor
General—urging the Court to summarily reverse or “GVR” (grant, vacate,
and remand) the decision below on narrower grounds.216 Like an amicus brief
opposing a defendant’s certiorari petition, such a brief would put the Office’s
interests directly opposite those of a criminal defendant. Because the Oﬃce

213 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a) (2019); see also James E. Pfander & David P. Baltmanis, Response,
W(h)ither Bivens?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 231, 238 (2013) (explaining that DOJ represents
Bivens defendants “only where doing so advances the interests of the Government”).
214 This could happen, for instance, where several cases working their way through the lower
courts raise the same legal question.
215 A “state-on-top” case is one where the government, rather than the defendant, asks the
Supreme Court to reverse the decision of a lower court.
216 See Rosenzweig, supra note 173, at 2081 (describing the various actions the Solicitor General
might ask the Court to take in response to a confession of error).
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would represent the interests of defendants collectively, that poses no
insurmountable hurdle.217
The ﬁnal component of the Oﬃce’s certiorari-stage work would be in
responding to CVDGs from the Court itself. The Supreme Court regularly
calls for the view of the Solicitor General in cases where the United States is
not a party.218 Our expectation is that the Court would similarly seek the
views of the Defender General when it contemplates granting certiorari in a
criminal matter and the Oﬃce has not already participated.
2. The Defender General’s Role on the Merits
Unlike the certiorari docket, where the Defender General’s involvement
would (of necessity) be sporadic, the Defender General would participate as
counsel or amicus in most, or even all, of the Supreme Court’s merits cases
implicating criminal law or procedure.
The Defender General (or her designee) would presumptively serve as
defense counsel in matters where her oﬃce ﬁled the certiorari petition. This
is only a presumption. The defendant might wish to change lawyers.
Moreover, the Defender General might discover, after ﬁling the certiorari
petition, that the defendant’s interests do not align with the interests of
defendants collectively. In such a case, the Defender General would need to
withdraw from the case. The same thing happens in Bivens cases when a
government lawyer representing a federal “employee becomes aware that the
representation of the employee could involve the assertion of a position that
conﬂicts with the interests of the United States.”219 Unless the employee is
willing to waive the position, the government lawyer withdraws from the case
and (assuming other requirements are satisﬁed) a private attorney takes over
the representation. The Oﬃce of the Defender General could promulgate
regulations working much the same way. In an extraordinary case where
withdrawal couldn’t be completed immediately—for instance if the conﬂict
did not arise until oral argument—the Defender General’s duty would, like a
government lawyer in the equivalent situation in a Bivens case, be to “take all
reasonable steps to avoid prejudice to the [defendant].”220 To be sure, midcase withdrawal would be problematic, because the Defender General, having
been a lawyer for the defendant, would be unable to appear in the case as
217 To be sure, there would be costs associated with the Defender General opposing a speciﬁc
defendant on the merits. We address this issue infra, at text accompanying notes 231–232.
218 See Neal Devins & Saikrishna B. Prakash, Reverse Advisory Opinions, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
859, 881-84 (2013) (reviewing the process by which the Supreme Court solicits these “reverse
advisory opinions” from the Solicitor General and other parties, and the impact thereof on the
relationship between the Court and the Solicitor General).
219 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a)(11) (2019).
220 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a)(12).
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amicus opposing the relief sought by the defendant.221 This just reinforces
the importance of the Defender General’s pre-certiorari petition screening.
Additionally, defendants whose certiorari petitions are granted (or who
are respondents in matters where the prosecution’s petition has been granted)
could ask the Oﬃce to take over the case.222 In deciding whether to assume
representation in a merits case, the Oﬃce’s central consideration would be
whether the defendant’s interests line up with those of defendants
collectively. The Oﬃce could not take on a merits case where it would be
ethically bound to advance an argument that would be detrimental to the
interests of defendants as a class.
Where the Defender General represents a defendant, she would
participate like any other lead counsel in brieﬁng and arguing the case. In
other cases, the Defender General would appear as an amicus, but not, we
hope, as an ordinary amicus. In theory, any amicus can ask the Court for
permission to partake in oral argument.223 In reality, only the Solicitor
General’s requests stand a realistic chance of being granted.224 The Court
“almost always grants” motions from the Solicitor General to participate in
oral argument in cases where the United States is not a party.225 Because the
Defender General would be the Solicitor General’s counterpart in criminal
cases, we hope that the Court would treat her requests for amicus oral
argument similarly.
The Defender General’s substantive stances in its merits-stage amicus
briefs and arguments will vary depending on the case. Where the Defender
General and the defendant see the case in similar terms, the Defender
General would supplement the presentation of the defense counsel. This
would be especially valuable in cases where the defense lawyer is not an expert
Supreme Court advocate.226
In other cases, the Defender General might have a diﬀerent view than the
defendant on a discrete issue. For example, the defendant and the Defender
General might disagree on what remedy the Court should order for some
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
We suspect that this will happen rarely; having secured a certiorari grant, the existing
defense lawyer is likely to resist such a change. See Mauro, supra note 144.
223 SUP. CT. R. 28(7).
224 Cordray & Cordray, supra note 127, at 1355; see also Crespo, supra note 3, at 2024 (“In practice
the Court deems [the required] ‘extraordinary circumstances’ to be present when the Solicitor
General seeks to argue, but absent otherwise—including when amici seek leave to argue in support
of criminal defendants.”).
225 Cordray & Cordray, supra note 127, at 1355. This is how the Solicitor General manages to
appear in oral arguments in seventy-two percent of the Court’s criminal cases. Crespo, supra note
3, at 2013.
226 Indeed, where the Defender General sees the case as the defendant does and the defendant
is represented by a high-caliber Supreme Court lawyer, the Defender General may elect not to
participate at all.
221
222
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error in the proceedings below. Cases could even arise where the Defender
General appears as amicus in support of the prosecutor. This could happen
when a defendant seeks relief that would be injurious to defendants in
general. An example will illustrate how this could work. The Supreme Court
has instructed federal appeals courts to give district judges wide berth to
disagree with the United States Sentencing Guidelines on policy grounds.227
That discretion often works to the beneﬁt of defendants.228 Occasionally,
however, a sentencing judge will conclude that a guideline is too lenient as a
matter of policy.229 A defendant in such a case might ask the Supreme Court
to impose limits on a sentencing judge’s discretion to disagree with the
Guidelines on policy grounds.230 That relief, though good for the particular
defendant, would likely be bad for defendants in general. If the Court heard
such a case on the merits, the Defender General might choose to argue
against the defendant.
There are unquestionably costs for permitting the Defender General to
overtly oppose a position taken by a speciﬁc criminal defendant. Doing so
could, as we have suggested, enhance the Defender General’s credibility with
the Court, but it might at the same time undermine the Defender General’s
credibility with the criminal defense bar. That, in turn, might discourage
criminal defense lawyers from cooperating with the Oﬃce—for instance, by
alerting it to emerging certiorari-worthy issues percolating in the lower
courts. An individual defendant who ﬁnds himself opposed by both a
prosecutor and an agency representing the interests of criminal defendants,
moreover, might regard this “teaming up” against him as particularly unfair.
We recognize these potential costs of empowering the Defender General
to oppose criminal defendants in particular cases, but ultimately conclude
that they are worth bearing. As we explored above, when speciﬁc criminal
defendants have interests that aren’t aligned with the interests of criminal
227 See, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 110 (2007) (“[I]t would not be an abuse
of discretion for a district court to conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that the
crack/powder disparity yields a sentence ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve §3553(a)’s purposes, even
in a mine-run case.”).
228 See Scott Michelman & Jay Rorty, Doing Kimbrough Justice: Implementing Policy
Disagreements with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1083, 1113-14 (2012)
(reviewing cases wherein judges have weighed policy and individualized factors to arrive at more
lenient sentences).
229 E.g., United States v. VandeBrake, 771 F. Supp. 2d 961, 999, 1012-13 (N.D. Iowa 2011)
(sentencing a defendant to forty-eight months’ imprisonment where the guideline range was twentyone to twenty-seven months, based on policy disagreement with the guidelines), aﬀ ’d, 679 F.3d 1030
(8th Cir. 2012).
230 Full disclosure: one of us was counsel to a petitioner in such a case. See Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, United States v. VandeBrake, 568 U.S. 1193 (2013) (mem.) (No. 12-488). The certiorari
petition was denied. VandeBrake, 568 U.S. 1193. Obviously, we are writing only in our personal
capacities.
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defendants generally, there is a danger that they will present positions that,
if adopted, would be detrimental to defendants in the general run of cases,
or, as we saw with Shatzer, will not argue for positions that would be beneﬁcial
to defendants generally.231 Only a Defender General empowered to urge the
Court to reject the defendant’s position in the former case or to adopt a
position not articulated by the defendant in the latter can correct for
divergences between the interests of a defendant and defendants generally.
That said, these concerns might suggest that the Defender General should
be cautious in exercising her ability to outright oppose a defendant’s position.
Over time, as the Oﬃce built up its credibility with the Court, the Defender
General might ﬁnd that merely declining to participate would send a
suﬃciently strong signal to the Court about the Oﬃce’s view of a case without
requiring the Defender General to actually say that a particular defendant
should lose. Indeed, remaining silent is the tack that the U.S. Solicitor
General sometimes takes in criminal cases where OSG does not endorse a
particularly aggressive position taken by a state—perhaps because OSG is not
eager to damage relationships with prosecution-side lawyers.232 Thus, while
we think an eﬀective Defender General would sometimes need to disagree
with particular defendants, she could choose to do so only in cases where the
beneﬁts of doing so outweigh the costs.
*

*

*

In summary, a Defender General empowered to participate in Supreme
Court litigation at the certiorari and merits stages would go a far ways
towards counteracting the systemic distortion in Supreme Court rulemaking
we described in Part I. We stress, however, that we are not claiming that the
Defender General would somehow lead to perfect neutrality in Supreme
Court criminal cases—whatever that might mean. That is, the ideology and
preferences of Supreme Court Justices will ultimately remain the most
powerful determinant of the content of the Court’s criminal cases. The Burger
and Rehnquist Courts would almost certainly have moved criminal procedure
jurisprudence in the direction of government interests even if the Defender

See supra subsection I.B.1.
For example, consider Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014), where the State of Florida
sought to defend its strict rule that a defendant must have an IQ score of 70 or lower to qualify as
intellectually disabled and thus ineligible for capital punishment under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002). The U.S. Solicitor General’s Oﬃce declined to participate in the case as amicus curiae
in support of either side, and the Court rejected Florida’s rule as inconsistent with Atkins. See Hall,
134 S. Ct. at 2000-01.
231
232
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General had been created in the 1970s.233 Our claim, instead, is that the
structure of Supreme Court litigation as it exists now introduces additional
government-friendly skew on top of what is already present, and it is this skew
that the Defender General would counteract.
B. Implementation
Having laid out our ideal vision for what the Defender General would do,
we now turn to more practical questions. This Section will discuss how the
Oﬃce of the Defender General might be implemented in our system. We
ﬁrst discuss the question of how the Defender General would be selected, and
by whom—and also how she would, if necessary, be held accountable. We then
explore how the Oﬃce of the Defender General should be designed to best
enable it to accomplish its mission.
1. Selection and Accountability
For there to be a Defender General, someone must have the power to select
her. And the choice of which person or institution selects the Defender
General could have significant implications for what kind of Defender General
we might get. This Section will explore that question, but before doing so it is
useful to make clear what kind of lawyer we hope would occupy the position.
As we see it, the role requires two distinct and equally important qualities.
First, the Defender General must be committed to the formal mission of the
Office: defending the interests of criminal defendants generally. A good
Defender General would have a demonstrated commitment to, and
knowledge of, criminal justice. Someone with experience in public defense, or
perhaps extensive pro bono work, could fit the bill. We caution, though, that
it would be important for the Defender General to recognize the distinction
between arguing for the interests of defendants collectively and arguing for
the interests of particular defendants. An effective Defender General (when
acting as an amicus) would sometimes be willing to say that the defendant in
a particular case should lose. Some lawyers who had spent long periods as
individual defense lawyers might find that transition challenging.234
The second quality the Defender General must have—of course—is
expertise as a Supreme Court advocate. This does not mean that plausible
candidates need to have previously argued at the Court. Nor should prior
233 See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences,
Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2468 (1996) (arguing that under Chief Justices Burger and
Rehnquist, “the Supreme Court [had] profoundly changed its approach to constitutional criminal
procedure since the 1960s” by becoming “less sympathetic to claims of individual rights and more
accommodating to assertions of the need for public order”).
234 See infra note 271.
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experience as a Supreme Court clerk be seen as a prerequisite. Although the
Supreme Court bar is dominated by former Supreme Court clerks,235 the
clerkship experience does not provide unique training or knowledge that
lawyers without those clerkships cannot obtain through other means.236
What we think is necessary, though, is at least some background in the
specialized nature of Supreme Court litigation. As Justice Kagan has noted,
lawyers unfamiliar with the norms of Supreme Court advocacy do not serve
their clients well.237
These two qualities may be in tension in some instances. The most
dedicated advocates for the rights of criminal defendants might not be the
most experienced Supreme Court advocates. And the lawyers with the most
expertise in Supreme Court advocacy might not be particularly committed to
protecting defendants. The position would, we expect, be coveted by aspiring
Supreme Court advocates, since it would present one of the best ways to get
oral argument experience outside of the Solicitor General’s oﬃce. If the
Oﬃce of the Defender General became just a launching pad for lucrative
appellate litigation careers, it might attract candidates who would not take its
mission as seriously as we would hope.
To this problem, we can say only that there would likely be a number of
talented candidates vying for the position, and we are conﬁdent that at any
given time there would be a number of lawyers in America who have both
needed qualities. As long as the selection process were careful and fair, an
excellent candidate could be found.
But who could be trusted with the power to select the Defender General?
There are a number of possibilities, but we see two main options. First, the
Defender General could be selected by the Supreme Court Justices. Second,
she could be selected by some kind of special-purpose board or institution
charged with that responsibility. In the discussion that follows, we will
initially bracket questions about constitutional requirements in order to lay
out what we see as the ideal set of arrangements.

235 See Joan Biskupic, Janet Roberts & John Shiﬀman, At America’s Court of Last Resort, a
Handful of Lawyers Now Dominates the Docket, R EUTERS (Dec. 8, 2014, 10:30 AM GMT),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus [https://perma.cc/V35X-3MZM]
(“Among the 66 leading [Supreme Court] lawyers, 31 worked as a clerk for a Supreme Court justice.”).
236 We note that the most accomplished criminal specialist before the Supreme Court in
recent decades—Michael Dreeben—did not clerk at the Court. See Michael R. Dreeben,
O’MELVENY, https://www.omm.com/professionals/michael-r-dreeben [https://perma.cc/CU5CHJUV] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
237 See Harris, supra note 2 (quoting Justice Kagan as saying, “I think that the litigants who are
underserved in terms of lawyering quality are criminal defendants . . . [whose] trial lawyer . . . is
doing their ﬁrst Supreme Court argument without thinking about the court, without thinking about
the way it operates, rather than giving [the case] to an experienced Supreme Court bar member.”).
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The advantage of having the Defender General selected by the Supreme
Court is that the Justices know what kind of advocacy they are looking for,
and would thus be ideally positioned to select a skilled Supreme Court expert.
Moreover, there is already a good model in existing laws and practices, as
federal appellate judges are currently empowered to select the heads of
federal public defender oﬃces in their respective circuits, and district judges
typically select the attorneys who will serve on panels for appointment in
individual cases.238 It thus might seem only logical for the Supreme Court to
select the Defender General who would practice before the Court.
There are drawbacks to that approach, however. First, the current
system of heavy judicial control over indigent defense has attracted
criticism. A 1993 report by a Committee of the Judicial Conference concluded
that federal indigent defense needed greater independence from the
judiciary.239 The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers has
made a similar recommendation, citing potential conflicts of interest and
other concerns.240 David Patton, the head of the Federal Defenders of New
York, has argued that the judiciary’s power over indigent defense can raise
difficult ethical questions.241
Moreover, the Justices do not have a perfect track record in the instances
where they have power to make appointments. Consider the Justices’ use of
their power to appoint amici in cases where neither party is defending the
judgment below, which happens with some regularity. Kate Shaw has noted
that the Justices in recent years have almost always appointed former clerks
or other lawyers having personal relationships with one or more Justices, a
number of whom were arguing before the Court for the ﬁrst time.242 While
these appointed amici generally seem to have eﬀectively discharged their
238 NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, FEDERAL INDIGENT DEFENSE 2015: THE
INDEPENDENCE IMPERATIVE 14 (2015), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/f06b8fd6-8386-4e519539-71f964e4fa84/federal-indigent-defense-2015-the-independence-imperative.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q79E-DKF6]; David E. Patton, The Structure of Federal Public Defense: A Call for
Independence, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 353-54 (2017).
239 See COMM. TO REVIEW THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT PROGRAM, REPORT OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 75-77 (1993)
(“The CJA program has become so large and complex that full-time management is needed to run
it. . . . [Under the Committee’s proposed recommendation], [t]he responsibilities of the federal
judiciary would change substantially . . . from controller to the more appropriate role of consultant
and impartial evaluator under the adversarial system.”).
240 See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 238, at 9 (concluding that
“[c]ontrol over federal indigent defense services must be insulated from judicial interference”).
241 For a discussion of these ethical questions, see Patton, supra note 238, at 368-72.
242 See Katherine Shaw, Essay, Friends of the Court: Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Amicus
Invitations, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1556-57, 1560-61 (2016) (pointing out that sixty-eight percent
of all appointed amici once served as law clerks to one or more Justices, and that that ﬁgure is
rising—and that ﬁfty-six percent of appointed amici “had never previously argued before the Court
at the time of their invitation”).
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responsibilities, the practice raises some concerns about the Court’s seeming
reliance on a system of patronage rather than a purely merit-based approach.
Given this problem, we think a better solution would be the creation of
some kind of board or commission with the power to select, or at least to
recommend the selection of, the Defender General. Again, there is already a
good model here in current law: each federal judicial district is permitted to
rely for indigent defense on a “Community Defender Organization,” which
is “a private nonproﬁt organization with its own board of directors that selects
an executive director to head the oﬃce.”243 A similar model could work for
the Oﬃce of the Defender General.
Of course, this raises the question of who would appoint the board
members. For that task, we look to the Supreme Court, but we do so
cautiously. There are again drawbacks to relying on the Court. The Chief
Justice is empowered to appoint the members of a number of important
committees such as the Federal Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,244 which
is charged with proposing amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Chief Justice Roberts has been criticized for choosing committee
members who are mostly white, male, and civil-defense-friendly.245 There is
thus a concern that a board selected at the discretion of the Court might
reflect the Justices’ views on criminal defense. Still, someone must do the
picking. We thus propose to cabin the Court’s discretion by specifying a
required background for each seat on the board. For purposes of discussion,
we propose a five-member board consisting of: (i) an experienced member
of the Supreme Court bar, (ii) a formerly incarcerated person, (iii) a
representative of the federal defender service, (iv) a representative from
state public defense, and (v) a representative of the private criminal defense
bar. We stress that we are not committed to this specific list;246 what
matters is narrowing the Court’s personnel selection in such a way as to
ensure the broadest possible representation of the interests of criminal
defendants as a class.

Patton, supra note 238, at 352-53.
About the Judicial Conference, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts/governance-judicial-conference/about-judicial-conference [https://perma.cc/MC3E-9CKH]
(last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
245 Brooke D. Coleman, The Committee That Dictates the Rules of American Courts Looks Nothing
Like America—or the Federal Judiciary, SLATE (Oct. 24, 2018, 4:03 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2018/10/john-roberts-courts-rules-rigged.html [https://perma.cc/C2GQ-7PMH] (“Of the
current 14 members on the committee, nine are white men, four are white women, and one is a black
man. These members have also mostly spent their careers working for large law ﬁrms that defend
companies against class actions, and not the plaintiﬀ-side ﬁrms that bring them.”).
246 Perhaps, for instance, the board should include a representative of the criminal law
academy. We would never dream of proposing such a thing.
243
244

2020]

The Defender General

1519

The board would select the Defender General for a nonrenewable ﬁveyear term. That period would be long enough to develop credibility with the
Justices, but short enough that any particular oﬃceholder would have only a
limited ability to inﬂuence the law. The Defender General would be subject
to removal by the board for cause. Although it is our expectation that this
power would rarely need to be exercised, given that we would expect the
board to be able to select from a number of highly qualiﬁed candidates, some
form of accountability is necessary given the importance of the position and
the possibility that a Defender General might interpret his or her
responsibilities in some idiosyncratic way. Although the Justices of the Court
would not have a direct say in appointment and removal, they would have
some indirect inﬂuence, as the board would be more likely to remove
Defenders General who had seemingly lost credibility with the Court (for
example, if the Court started refusing to permit the Oﬃce to participate in
oral argument as an amicus).
This arrangement strikes us as ideal. But would it be constitutional? To
answer that, we must ask whether the Defender General would qualify as an
“Officer of the United States” under the Constitution’s Appointments Clause.247
If so, the Constitution would not permit a board appointed by the Court to hold
the appointment power.248 There is, however, a plausible argument that the
Defender General would not qualify as an “Officer of the United States.”
Both the Supreme Court and DOJ’s Oﬃce of Legal Counsel (OLC) have
concluded that “oﬃcer” status turns on two key questions: (1) whether the
person performs a “‘continuing’ position established by law” and (2) what
constitutes “the extent of power an individual wields in carrying out his
assigned functions.”249 The Defender General’s role would unquestionably
satisfy one of these criteria, as it would be a “continuing oﬃce established by
law.”250 But the Defender General would arguably not exercise suﬃcient
power to qualify as an “Oﬃcer.” This is not to say that the position is
unimportant. Although the Supreme Court has thus far been unwilling to lay
out the precise test in greater detail,251 OLC has concluded that what matters
is whether the actor in question is exercising “delegated sovereign authority,”

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
So-called “principal oﬃcers” must be appointed by the President and conﬁrmed by the
Senate, while Congress can authorize “inferior oﬃcers” to be appointed by the President alone, the
judiciary, or heads of departments. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659-61 (1997).
249 Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018) (quoting United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S.
508, 511 (1879)); see also Oﬃcers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31
Op. O.L.C. 73, 76-78 (2007).
250 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052.
251 Id.
247
248
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deﬁned as “power lawfully conferred by the government to bind third parties,
or the government itself, for the public beneﬁt.”252
The Defender General would have no such power. She would only have
the power to advocate for particular legal rulings; she would not have the
power to bind the public through her interpretations of the law. In this way,
she is unlike the administrative law judges considered in Lucia, who had the
power to regulate hearings, take testimony, and enforce compliance with
discovery orders.253 The Defender General could, concededly, bind the
individual defendants she was representing by, say, conceding particular
arguments. But this is not obviously the same thing as binding someone for
the public beneﬁt.254 If that’s right, the Defender General would not be an
“Oﬃcer of the United States,” meaning that the Appointments Clause would
“care[] not a whit about who name[s]” her.255
That said, the Appointments Clause question strikes us as a close one. To
the extent that our ideal arrangement falls on the wrong side of the
constitutional line, we think our proposal can be modiﬁed to work within the
strictures of the Appointments Clause with only small costs. We would retain
our proposed board, but we would make its duties advisory; it would make
hiring recommendations to the Supreme Court, which would retain the
ultimate appointment power. We would also make the Defender General
removable at will by the Court, although the Board would be responsible for
making recommendations about removal to the Court. Making the Defender
General subject to at-will removal would avoid any constitutional problems
under Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.256 It
would also help ensure that the Defender General qualiﬁes as an “inferior
oﬃcer” whose power of appointment can be vested in the “courts of law”
rather than a “principal oﬃcer” who would need to be appointed by the
President.257 Giving the Court the ultimate control over hiring and ﬁring
would make the Defender General a bit less independent, but our hope is that
the Justices would defer to the advisory board most of the time, overruling its
recommendations only in exceptional cases.
Oﬃcers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. at 87.
Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053.
A helpful analogy comes from the realm of public defense. In Ferri v. Ackerman, the
Supreme Court determined that in that public defenders’ “duty is not to the public at large,” they
are not entitled to immunity from suit. 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979). Relying on this reasoning, one
commentator concluded that a board controlling federal public defenders would not be constrained
by the Appointments Clause. See Patton, supra note 238, at 391-92. Similar reasoning might apply to
the Defender General.
255 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051.
256 See 561 U.S. 477, 508-10 (2010) (ﬁnding no violation of Appointments Clause if inferior
oﬃcers can be removed at will).
257 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (capitalization altered); see also Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051 n.3.
252
253
254
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2. Design of the Oﬃce
Another key question of implementation is how the Oﬃce of the
Defender General would be structured. Choices here may have profound
implications for the success of the proposal. The structure of the Oﬃce of the
Solicitor General has likely been a major source of its inﬂuence. As Ryan
Black and Ryan Owens have suggested, it may be the attorneys other than the
Solicitor General that have done the most to generate that Oﬃce’s trust and
credibility with the Justices.258 The Defender General should follow the
Solicitor General’s lead.
The Office should thus employ a number of skilled lawyers in addition to
the Defender General. These lawyers—unlike the Defender General herself—
would have no set limit on their time of service, thus enabling a deep
institutional memory within the organization and longer-term relationships
with the Court (much like the one Michael Dreeben was able to develop
during his longtime tenure as the Solicitor General’s “criminal deputy”).
These attorneys would be ineligible, however, for direct appointment as the
Defender General, in order to ensure a good mix between stability and
fresh eyes in the Office. That rule would help ensure that only attorneys
with a long-term commitment to the goals of the Office would take the
positions, rather than attracting those who just saw the role as a stepping
stone to the next oﬃce.
Nevertheless, there would necessarily be some turnover in the Oﬃce as
some experienced attorneys were lured away to private practice—something
that happens regularly in the Oﬃce of the Solicitor General. Again, it would
be helpful to copy the Solicitor General’s model, and to have Deputy
Defenders General who could be selected from among the longer-serving,
and most proven, Assistants to the Defender General. Those Deputies would,
we hope, become especially trusted advocates at the Court over time, and could
match up well with their counterparts from the Solicitor General’s Office.
The Oﬃce would also need to have the ability to understand the current
problems faced by criminal defendants. Appellate litigators themselves are
probably not the best-equipped professionals to develop that kind of
expertise. For that reason, it would be important for the Oﬃce to employ a
small team of criminal justice policy experts and researchers, as well, perhaps,
as formerly incarcerated individuals and experienced trial-level criminal
defense lawyers, who could advise the Defender General as she selects the
Oﬃce’s positions and priorities.
258 See Black & Owens, supra note 130, at 462 (“[W]e believe that OSG success likely stems
from the oﬃce’s longstanding relationship with the Court and with the professionalism its attorneys
display. . . . [O]ur data suggest that the OSG observes something unique that leads to its built-in
advantage. The answer, we speculate, might be found in the OSG’s professionals.”).
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C. Potential Objections
This Section considers potential objections to the proposed Oﬃce of the
Defender General. We consider ﬁrst whether other existing institutions could
perform the Defender General’s functions. Second, we examine whether
conceptualizing the Defender General’s client as the collective interests of
criminal defendants poses too many theoretical and practical problems.
Third, we confront the argument that creating a Defender General would
require creating “generals” in other legal contexts.
1. Institutional Alternatives
A plausible objection to our proposal would claim that the work we
envision the Defender General performing already is—or could be—carried
out by existing institutions. The two most plausible candidates are the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) and Stanford
Law School’s Supreme Court Litigation Clinic. Both are major players at the
Supreme Court. The NACDL, which has been described as “among the
[Court’s] most active amicus groups,”259 aims to “submit amicus briefs in the
majority of criminal cases heard each term by the United States Supreme
Court.”260 The Stanford clinic is co-directed by Professor Jeﬀrey Fisher, who
has personally argued, by our count, twenty-four criminal cases in the
Supreme Court.261 Andrew Crespo aptly calls Fisher a “one-man expert
Supreme Court criminal defense bar.”262 We are great admirers of both the
NACDL and the Stanford clinic, and nothing we have to say here should be
259 Joshua B. Fischman, Do the Justices Vote Like Policy Makers? Evidence from Scaling the Supreme
Court with Interest Groups, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S269, S279 (2015).
260 National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, NACDL Amicus Curiae Committee
Mission Statement 1 (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/e63ce877-aa9f-44d7acdc-a3b3f4ef80f7/amicus-program-2015-adopted-roster-updated-02192020.pdf [https://perma.cc/
L32X-5HTQ].
261 We are relying on the cases listed on Fisher’s Oyez page. Jeﬀrey L. Fisher, OYEZ,
https://www.oyez.org/advocates/jeﬀrey_l_ﬁsher [https://perma.cc/DC8F-47DR] (last visited Apr. 3,
2020). His criminal credits include Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020); United States v.
Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018); Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144 (2018); Koons v. United States, 138
S. Ct. 1783 (2018); Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017); Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173
(2015); Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014); Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126
(2014); Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178 (2013); Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013); Greene
v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34 (2011); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011); United States v.
Tinklenberg, 563 U.S. 647 (2011); Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010); United States v.
O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218 (2010); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Waddington v.
Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179 (2009); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Burgess v. United States,
553 U.S. 124 (2008); Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548
U.S. 140 (2006); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004); and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
262 Crespo, supra note 3, at 2026.

2020]

The Defender General

1523

understood as criticism of them. At the same time, neither is an adequate
substitute for an Oﬃce of the Defender General.263
Consider the Stanford clinic ﬁrst. While the clinic has been a critical voice
in the Supreme Court on behalf of criminal defendants, its mission and
incentives diﬀer from the Defender General’s. We have explained that unlike
traditional criminal defense lawyers, the Defender General would litigate on
behalf of a cause—criminal defendants as a class—not just a client.264 In an
article examining how law school clinics ﬁt into the Supreme Court bar,
Fisher explains that the Stanford clinic consciously rejected a cause-lawyering
model in favor of a client-centered approach.265 The Stanford clinic has good
pedagogical reasons for that choice, but it entails, as Fisher acknowledges,
that the clinic does not avoid cases or arguments on the grounds that they
may produce bad law for defendants collectively.266 If it did, Fisher explains,
“[t]he clinic itself would start controlling the shape of the law, instead of
leaving that power to the Court.”267 We understand why a law school clinic
would wish to avoid the appearance (or reality) of “shaping the law.” But
shaping the law in a pro-defendant direction is a central premise of a
Defender General’s Oﬃce.
The NACDL’s mission more closely aligns with that of the Oﬃce of the
Defender General. The organization states in its Amicus Curiae Committee
Mission Statement that it seeks to “provide amicus assistance on the federal
and state level in those cases that present issues of importance to criminal
defendants, criminal defense lawyers, and/or the criminal justice system as a
whole.”268 This sounds not that far aﬁeld from the Defender General’s
mission. We would leave the interests of “criminal defense lawyers” out of the
equation, but to its credit, the NACDL has ﬁled amicus briefs on the
defendants’ side in several major ineﬀective assistance of counsel cases, where
the interests of defendants and defense lawyers might be thought to
diverge.269 That said, we have explained that representing the interests of
263 That said, Professor Fisher, given his expertise and commitment to protecting the rights
of criminal defendants, would obviously make an ideal Defender General.
264 See supra Section II.A; see also Fisher, supra note 161, at 193 (“The mission of a public
defender’s oﬃce is to represent one client at a time . . . . Such an oﬃce would not refuse a
representation (or decline to make an argument in the midst of a representation) for fear of making
‘bad law’ for other criminal defendants.”).
265 See id. at 145 (“Although I think that a Supreme Court clinic might reasonably decide to
follow either approach, the Stanford Clinic, for example, has chosen to pursue a client-based model,
in which the clinic views itself more as a legal services oﬃce than a cause-lawyering enterprise.”).
266 See id. at 191-95.
267 Id. at 195.
268 National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 260, at 1.
269 See, e.g., Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioner, Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) (No. 16-327); Brief of the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
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criminal defendants as a class in the Supreme Court sometimes means
aﬃrmatively arguing against a particular criminal defendant.270 We suspect
that it would be politically and institutionally awkward for an organization of
and by criminal defense lawyers to do that.271 The Defender General, on the
other hand, would lack such political and institutional constraints.
The bigger reason why the NACDL does not already fulﬁll the role we
propose for the Defender General has to do with resources. The NACDL
relies on a committee of six national co-chairs to run its amicus program,
none of whom are full-time NACDL staﬀ members.272 The national co-chairs
are augmented by between two and four circuit vice-chairs for each federal
circuit.273 The actual amicus briefs are authored by lawyer-volunteers, drawn
substantially from the ranks of large law ﬁrms, law school professors, and
other criminal defense and civil liberty organizations.274 Participation by the
NACDL at the certiorari stage is, according to its guidelines, the “exception,”
while “abstention is the rule.”275 The NACDL’s amicus program provides an
enormously valuable service to criminal defendants, but we think it clear that
these arrangements fall well short of what a fully staﬀed Oﬃce of the
Defender General could do.
Missions and resources aside, there is a deeper problem with looking to
institutions like the NACDL or the Stanford clinic to perform the functions
that we envision for a Defender General. The service that we envision the
Defender General providing—representing criminal defendants as a class—
is a public service. It is directed at achieving a more balanced—and thus more
just—criminal legal system, which would work to the public beneﬁt. And we
envision that the Oﬃce would possess perquisites that other Supreme Court
litigants (aside from the Solicitor General) lack.276 We think that public

Laﬂer v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (Nos. 10-209 & 10-444); Brief of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 356 (2010) (No. 08-651).
270 See supra text accompanying notes 211 and 227–229.
271 Cf. Susan Bandes, Repression and Denial in Criminal Lawyering, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 339,
359 (2006) (“Many of the lawyers who thrive in criminal defense . . . seem to relish the ﬁght. They
may be energized by challenging, and preferably thwarting, authority, by ﬁghting for the underdog,
or by their political commitments. Not all of these lawyers have a systemic critique of the criminal
justice system . . . .”).
272 Currently, one of the co-chair positions is split, so that there are seven co-chairs in all.
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 260, at 5. Of these, two are law school
professors, four are lawyers in private practice, and one is a federal defender. Id. One of the two law
professors is, naturally, Stanford’s Jeﬀrey Fisher. Id.
273 Id. at 7-8.
274 Id. at 12. Though the amicus authors are not compensated, they do receive a “handsome
certiﬁcate of thanks from NACDL’s President.” Id. at 1.
275 Id. at 8.
276 See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
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functions should, in general, be performed by public oﬃcials.277 Stanford Law
School and the NACDL are terriﬁc institutions, but their leaders are not
public oﬃcials.278
2. Identifying Collective Interests
Another objection to our proposal concerns the Defender General’s
charge to protect the interests of criminal defendants as a class. What exactly
are these collective interests, and how is the Defender General supposed to
identify them? Moreover, does it even make sense to talk about the collective
interests of defendants generally when individual defendants may have wildly
disparate interests, depending on the crimes for which they were convicted
and other variables? Under this objection, the Defender General would either
face hopeless uncertainty or would use the vagueness of her charge as an
excuse to pursue her private policy preferences.
In most cases, we think, the objection will prove more theoretical than
real. Usually, answering the question, “What legal rule is in the interests of
criminal defendants collectively?” will be obvious. That said, there will be
cases in which it proves diﬃcult. That’s because possible changes to legal rules
sometimes create winners and losers among criminal defendants.
Take the Supreme Court’s decision to give federal district judges more
sentencing discretion in the wake of declaring the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines unconstitutional, which made defendants like Derrick Kimbrough—
whose below-Guidelines sentence the Court blessed in Kimbrough v. United
States279—better off. At the same time, the change in the law simultaneously
harmed defendants like Gerard Cavera, whose above-Guidelines sentence was
upheld by the en banc Second Circuit in the immediate wake of Kimbrough, after
a pre-Kimbrough panel had overturned the sentence.280
277 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar
of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115, 13637 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006) (“Private actors generate ‘proprietary’ information; the
information produced by public agencies is ‘owned’ by the public. . . . Hence, to the extent that
public accountability depends upon transparency, contracting out to private parties would seem a
retreat from accountability.”). We describe the Defender General’s accountability above. See supra
subsection II.B.1.
278 The Stanford clinic is part of Stanford Law School, which is administered by academic
oﬃcials—a Dean, then a Provost, then a President, and ﬁnally a Board of Trustees. See University
Administration, STAN. UNIV., https://facts.stanford.edu/administration [https://perma.cc/9G5L99TF] (last visited Apr. 3, 2020). The NACDL is administered by an Executive Director, then a
President, and ﬁnally a Board of Directors. See Bylaws, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS
(Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.nacdl.org/Landing/Bylaws [https://perma.cc/7TWS-PLDB].
279 See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 90-91, 111 (2007) (reversing appellate court’s
determination that the below-Guidelines sentence was an abuse of discretion).
280 See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 185-87, 197 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting
United States v. Lucania, 379 F. Supp. 2d 288, 293-94 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)) (aﬃrming that a district
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If the Oﬃce of the Defender General had existed at the time, should it
have argued for or against federal sentencing discretion? Or should the fact
that the rule change would not make every defendant better oﬀ mean that the
Defender General would need to throw up her hands? We think in situations
like this, a good Defender General would research carefully, consult widely
with the policy experts in her oﬃce and the stakeholders (including
defendants and incarcerated individuals) beyond it, and generally do her best
to answer the question of what will do the most good for the most defendants.
Often, there will be an answer to that question, even if getting to that answer
requires some eﬀort.281
We acknowledge that in rare situations, there may not, even after research
and consultation, be a “right answer” to the question of what is in the interests
of criminal defendants as a class. And, relatedly, certain situations may
present particularly diﬃcult distributive quandaries. What if a legal rule will
beneﬁt a signiﬁcant number of white-collar defendants—while at the same
time harming similar number of convicted drug distributors? What if the
Court were considering moving away from exclusionary rules and in favor of
more civil damages actions—thereby harming guilty defendants and possibly
beneﬁting innocent criminal suspects?
In these situations—which, again, we expect to be relatively rare—it may
not be enough to simply say that the Defender General will make the
decision. If there is no right answer, a Defender General who insisted that
she knew which choice was really in defendants’ interests might undercut her
hard-earned credibility. What then?
The best path, we think, is to start with transparency. The Defender
General should explain the dilemma clearly and publicly. Just as every amicus
brief by the Solicitor General begins with a section titled “Interest of the
United States,”282 we think the Defender General’s briefs should begin by
explaining how the Oﬃce sees the issues mapping onto its charge. Where this
choice is especially challenging, the Defender General should say so
forthrightly. If the interests truly are in equipoise, the Defender General’s
Oﬃce might ﬁle a brief in support of neither party, and simply explain the
various consequences of the diﬀerent rules the Supreme Court is considering.

court may impose an above-Guidelines sentence when the Guidelines, “‘in the pursuit of national
uniformity in sentencing practices,’ do not take local circumstances into account”).
281 Our instinct (though it is only an instinct) is that discretion has largely been a boon for
criminal defendants as a group. The Defender General wouldn’t be limited to instincts; whatever
her initial sense of the issue, she would, as we have indicated, seek to verify or falsify it through
research and consultation.
282 For a recent example, see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1-2, Bostock v.
Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (Nos. 17-1618 & 17-1623).
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But perhaps a better approach in hard cases would be for the Defender
General to look to her Oﬃce’s raison d’etre as a tiebreaker. If, for example, a
rule will beneﬁt one group of defendants while harming others, the Defender
General might ask which group of defendants is most subject to the distorting
inﬂuence the Oﬃce was created to counteract. In this regard, the Defender
General might conclude that protecting indigent defendants is a higher
priority than protecting white-collar defendants, since the latter may be more
likely to be represented by expert Supreme Court counsel. This is merely a
possibility; making these hard choices—and explaining why she had done
so—would be the Defender General’s responsibility and burden.
We stress that the Solicitor General has a similar responsibility and
burden when he seeks to determine what the “interests of the United States”
are with respect to any given legal issue. True, in criminal cases, the Solicitor
General seems to ﬁnd this task relatively easy, as the Oﬃce appears mostly
to take the view that those interests line up squarely with the interests of
federal prosecutors.283 But in other contexts the task is much more challenging,
and the Solicitor General must resolve disputes among competing executive
branch and independent agencies that disagree about the position the
government should take.284 Compounding the problem is that there is no clear
consensus about how, exactly, the Solicitor General should conceptualize his
“client.” On one extreme the client is merely an “abstraction” that permits the
Solicitor General to exercise his judgment about the best path forward.285 On
the other end of the spectrum is the view that the Solicitor General should
think of himself as any other political appointee, whose job it is to do the
bidding of the administration.286 In between is a view that the Solicitor
283 See Crespo, supra note 3, at 2013 (noting that OSG “virtually always argues in opposition
to the criminal defendant—an unsurprising fact given that the oﬃce is itself a prosecutorial oﬃce”).
284 For some examples of these conﬂicts, see Francis J. Aul, Out of Many Clients, One: Conflict
of Interest and the Oﬃce of the Solicitor General, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 481-84 (2018). See also
Drew S. Days III, In Search of the Solicitor General’s Clients: A Drama with Many Characters, 83 KY.
L.J. 485, 487 (1994–1995) (noting that the Solicitor General’s “responsibility is ultimately not to any
particular agency or person in the federal government but rather to ‘the interests of the United
States’ which may, on occasion, conﬂict with the short-term programmatic goals of an aﬀected
governmental entity”).
285 See FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 97 (1962) (stating that the Solicitor General’s
“client is but an abstraction” and that “his guide is only the ethic of his own profession framed in
the ambience of his experience and judgment”); see also Rex E. Lee Conference on the Oﬃce of the
Solicitor General of the United States, 2003 BYU L. REV. 3, 39 [hereinafter Rex Lee Conference] (quoting
former Deputy Solicitor General Andrew Frey, ascribing to former Solicitor General Charles Fried
“the Harvard law professor model of the solicitor general” in which “naturally Harvard law
professors know what is right and what is wrong in the law” and “[t]heir role is to help guide the
Supreme Court to reach a correct decision”).
286 See Strauss, supra note 164, at 167-68 (describing the “Administration Approach,” under
which “the Solicitor General is just like any other high-ranking executive oﬃcial: His task is to help
carry out the Administration’s program”); see also Rex Lee Conference, supra note 285, at 40 (quoting
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General should see his responsibility as one “to the federal government as an
institution, not to the President or the Administration that he serves.”287
Which of these views is best is not for us to resolve here. Our point is
merely that despite the theoretical diﬃculty of identifying the Solicitor
General’s client, and despite the fact that hard questions about the scope of
the Solicitor General’s duties do arise, the Oﬃce of the Solicitor General
nonetheless keeps functioning—and, for the most part, functioning
eﬀectively. Similarly, even if conceptualizing defendants collectively as her
client may present challenges for the Defender General, we expect that she
would be able to work through them.
3. Other Generals
A ﬁnal potential objection to our proposal is that it opens the door to a
proliferation of Supreme Court “generals.” If criminal defendants need an
advocate to represent their collective interests in the Supreme Court, why not
a FOIA General, a Reproductive Rights General, a Class Action Plaintiﬀs’
General, or a Workers’ Rights General? This objection posits that a
proliferation of government oﬃces oriented towards Supreme Court
advocacy would be unwieldy and undesirable.
The objection is, we think, misplaced. In Part I, we explained that it is the
conﬂuence of two circumstances that generates the need to have a Defender
General represent the collective interests of criminal defendants—(i) the
Supreme Court is the preeminent national regulator of criminal justice, and
(ii) representation in criminal litigation at the Court is systematically
asymmetrical. If there are other areas where both circumstances are present—
that is, where the Court plays a significant policymaking role and advocacy is
consistently skewed—a “general” may indeed be an appropriate corrective.288
Criminal litigation may not be unique in this regard, but we doubt that there
are very many corners of the law that satisfy these twin criteria, at least to the

Judge Frank Easterbrook, stating: “My inclination is to say that the client of the solicitor general is
the executive branch of the United States government. Not to say that the solicitor general is an
independent agent, but he is litigating on behalf of the executive branch.” (quotation marks omitted)).
287 Strauss, supra note 164, at 166.
288 The mere fact of divergence between a lawyer’s interests and a client’s is not, however,
enough to justify the creation of a Supreme Court general, in our view. Agency problems are
endemic in attorney-client relationships. See Matthew C. Stephenson & Howell E. Jackson, Essay,
Lobbyists as Imperfect Agents: Implications for Public Policy in A Pluralist System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
1, 3 n.8 (2010) (collecting sources on attorney–client agency problems). We would not, for instance,
endorse a “Prosecutor General” to argue for the abstract interests of “prosecution” on the grounds
that individual prosecutors (including lawyers within the Oﬃce of the Solicitor General) may have
diverging personal interests.
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same degree. In part this is because in the non-criminal context, litigants more
generally recognize the utility of hiring expert Supreme Court advocates.289
That said, to the extent there are other areas of law with similar
pathologies, we say bring on the generals. That is, in areas where our legal
system relies on regulation via Supreme Court litigation, and where that
litigation process is systemically distorted, creating a new General’s Oﬃce
strikes us as likely to be cost-beneﬁt justiﬁed in most cases. Rather than
seeing a troubling objection, then, we are happy to take this argument as a
friendly amendment.
III. EXTENSIONS
Having proposed the Office of the Defender General and defended it
against objections in Part II, this final Part explores three ways in which the
proposal might be extended. Section III.A explores (and ultimately rejects) a
Defender General with even greater powers than those we proposed in Part II.
Section III.B considers the possibility that the Defender General’s work might
extend beyond the Supreme Court, to lower federal courts and state courts.
Lastly, Section III.C discusses alternative solutions to remedying the
asymmetrical power to shape criminal justice regulation—none of which seems
as attractive as the proposal to create an Office of the Defender General.
A. Modifying Ethical Rules
In Part II, we showed that, working with existing ethical rules, an Oﬃce
of the Defender General could be constructed as a reasonably close analogue
to the Oﬃce of the Solicitor General.290 But what if we don’t take existing
ethical rules as ﬁxed? This section considers the possibility of a Defender
General who is not just available to represent criminal defendants before the
Supreme Court, but who is the exclusive lawyer for criminal defendants before
the Supreme Court. An “exclusive” Defender General would be even better
equipped to overcome the uniﬁed vision and credibility asymmetries than the
version of the Defender General sketched in Part II. But it would come at a
cost that, ultimately, we think is not worth bearing.
The Solicitor General is the only lawyer who can represent the United
States in the Supreme Court.291 That means that no federal oﬃcial or agency
289 See Lazarus, supra note 136, at 1563 (“Better, more eﬀective advocates inﬂuence the
deveopment of the law and there is generally no court where such advocacy can wield more farreaching inﬂuence than the Supreme Court.”). For an explanation of why this general pattern often
does not apply to criminal cases, see supra notes 139–144 and accompanying text.
290 See supra Section II.A.
291 See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent
Agency Litigation, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 255, 256 (1994) (“Before the Supreme Court, however, the
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can petition for certiorari without ﬁrst winning the Solicitor General’s
support.292 It also means that when the Court grants certiorari, it is the
Solicitor General who ﬁles the briefs and presents argument, not an oﬃcial’s
private lawyer or an agency’s general counsel. The same arrangements could
apply to the Defender General. In Part II, we proposed a mechanism by
which a criminal defendant could ask the Defender General to ﬁle a certiorari
petition on his behalf. In an “exclusive Defender General” model, the
defendant’s request would be mandatory, and it wouldn’t just be for
representation, but for permission to ﬁle a certiorari petition at all. If the
Defender General declined, the defendant’s appeals would be over and the
judgment of the federal circuit court or last state court would be ﬁnal.293 But
if the Defender General determined that the case as a whole—or a particular
issue raised in it—warranted a certiorari petition, the Oﬃce would take the
matter over and represent the defendant until the end of Supreme Court
litigation, whether that be a denial of certiorari or a decision on the merits.
The defendant would (absent extraordinary circumstances) be “stuck” with
the Defender General as his Supreme Court lawyer.
As a preliminary matter, we do not believe that curtailing a criminal
defendant’s right to petition for certiorari in this way poses any
insurmountable constitutional problems. Criminal defendants have no due
process right to any appeal, much less review by the United States Supreme

[Solicitor] General, with some notable exceptions, controls all aspects of independent agency
litigation, including the power to seek certiorari.”). There are, as Devins notes, a handful of
exceptions where agencies are granted independent authority to litigate before the Supreme Court.
See id. at 274-78 (noting, for example, that the Federal Trade Commission and now-dissolved
Interstate Commerce Commission can “represent themselves before the Supreme Court whenever
the Solicitor General refuses to defend their position,” and that other statutory conﬂicts and political
circumstances might cause the Solicitor General to authorize “[d]ual governmental presentations”
in cases involving other agencies).
292 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 2-2.121 (2018), https://justice.gov/jm/jm2-2000-procedure-respect-appeals-generally#2-2.121 [https://perma.cc/78B9-UK8H] (“[A]ll
petitions for certiorari and direct appeals to the Supreme Court must be authorized by the Solicitor
General.”).
293 Things are a bit more complicated when it is the government, rather than the defendant,
that petitions for certiorari. Where the Defender General believes that the defendant’s interests
align with the interests of defendants collectively, the Defender General could simply assume the
representation. Where the interests do not align, however—for instance, if the Defender General
would be inclined to suggest error—it would not make sense for the Defender General to act as the
lawyer for the defendant. In such a case, the Court would need to appoint counsel to defend the
judgment below. See Brian P. Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici Curiae to
Defend Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 907, 909-10 (2011) (“[T]he Court has
tapped an attorney to support an undefended judgment below, or to take a speciﬁc position as an
amicus, forty-three times . . . .”). Because the appointed lawyer would, in eﬀect, be arguing for the
defendant’s interests, it makes more sense for the defendant in such a case to be represented by his
own counsel, with the Defender General’s Oﬃce appearing in its own name as amicus.
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Court.294 Nor does denying a criminal defendant a Supreme Court lawyer of
his choice violate the Sixth Amendment.295 Although the “right to select
counsel of one’s choice” is the “root meaning” of the Sixth Amendment
Counsel Clause,296 under current law the clause applies only to proceedings
in trial courts and on direct appeals of right, not discretionary appeals.297
But while the exclusive Defender General model is not unconstitutional,
it does raise thorny legal ethics problems.298 Every law student knows that
lawyers are not permitted to represent a client if the representation will be
“directly adverse to another client.”299 We have described the Defender
General’s “client” as the “interests of defendants as a class,” and we have
acknowledged that those interests do not always align with the interests of
particular defendants.300 Indeed, that divergence of interests is why a
Defender General is needed in the ﬁrst place.301 To be sure, because the
Defender General will have refused to authorize certiorari petitions in cases
raising obvious conﬂicts between defendants in general and the named
defendant, such conﬂicts will be rare in cases in which the Defender General
actually appears before the Court. But inevitably, the Defender General
294 See Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219, 1221 (2013)
(“[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to recognize a due process right to appeal in either
civil or criminal cases.”).
295 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For a fascinating recent discussion of the Counsel Clause, see
John Rappaport, The Structural Function of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice, 2016
SUP. CT. REV. 117.
296 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147-48 (2006).
297 Ross v. Moﬃtt, 417 U.S. 600, 611-12 (1974). This is why defendants cannot assert ineﬀective
assistance claims based on the performance of their counsel in discretionary appeals. See Wainwright
v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982) (per curiam).
298 The vexing ethical questions wouldn’t apply to the Defender General’s review of requests
for certiorari petitions. In deciding whether a defendant will be permitted to seek Supreme Court
review of his case, the Defender General would be acting as a gatekeeper, not as a lawyer subject to
the rules of professional conduct. At most, an applicant would be considered a “prospective client”
under the ethical rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.18(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019)
(“A person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship
with respect to a matter is a prospective client.”). (Indeed, if defendants were considered “clients”
of the Defender General at this stage, arguably Model Rule 1.2 would render the Defender General
unable to refuse to ﬁle a certiorari petition. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2019) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of
representation . . . . In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision . . . as to a plea
to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.”).) Because the
defendant would not yet be the Defender General’s client, the Defender General’s application
instructions would specify that applicants should not include privileged materials in their
submissions. See supra note 209. The ordinary conﬂict of interest rules would apply, however, once
the Defender General approves a certiorari petition and appears as the lawyer for a defendant at the
certiorari or the merits stage.
299 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
300 See supra notes 211, 227–229 and accompanying text.
301 See supra subsection I.B.1.
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would confront cases where asserting a viable argument on behalf of an
individual defendant would not align with the interests of defendants
collectively. Under existing ethical rules, that would put the Defender
General in an untenable position.
The question is whether conﬂict-of-interest rules should be changed to
permit the Defender General to represent a particular defendant before the
Supreme Court, notwithstanding that the Defender General’s ultimate loyalty
is to defendants collectively. We tolerate an analogous conﬂict of interest in
the case of the Solicitor General. Then-Solicitor General Drew Days
observed in 1994 that the Solicitor General’s “responsibility is ultimately not
to any particular agency or person in the federal government but rather to
‘the interests of the United States.’”302 Those interests, Days recognized,
“may, on occasion, conﬂict with the short-term programmatic goals of an
aﬀected governmental entity.”303 Yet when the Solicitor General appears in
the Supreme Court in such a case, he or she appears as the lawyer for these
“aﬀected entities.” Most controversially, that means that the Solicitor General
appears in the Supreme Court as counsel for the so-called “independent”
agencies.304 By deﬁnition, independent agencies are not subject to direct
presidential control,305 and it is not diﬃcult to imagine circumstances in
which their interests and those of the President (and thus the Solicitor
General) would diverge.306 Still, ethics rules do not preclude the Solicitor
General from representing them.307 To be sure, the analogy between the
Solicitor General representing an independent agency that would prefer its
own counsel and the Defender General representing an unwilling criminal
defendant isn’t perfect. Independent agencies are “independent” in certain

Days, supra note 284, at 487.
Id. To be sure, there are other ways of understanding the nature of the Solicitor General’s
“client.” Margaret Meriwether Cordray and Richard Cordray mention “nine diﬀerent conceptions,”
all oﬀered by a former Solicitor General. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 127, at 1360-61 (citing Drew
S. Days III, Executive Branch Advocate v. Oﬃcer of the Court: The Solicitor General’s Ethical Dilemma,
22 NOVA L. REV. 679, 681 (1998)).
304 See Devins, supra note 291, at 256 (“Before the Supreme Court, . . . the [Solicitor] General,
with some notable exceptions, controls all aspects of independent agency litigation.”).
305 See Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term—Foreword: Looking for Power in Public
Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 85 (2016) (noting that “independent agencies” are “insulated from
presidential control by for-cause limitations on removal”).
306 See Aul, supra note 284, at 481 (“As long as the Solicitor General represents these diverse
components of the federal government, conﬂicts will arise in the course of litigating a case . . . .”);
Wade H. McCree, Jr., The Solicitor General and His Client, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 337, 340-44 (1981)
(describing, in a lecture by the then-serving Solicitor General, some of the “speciﬁc situations in
which the Solicitor General’s Oﬃce is called upon to ascertain ‘the interests of the United States’
and to resolve conﬂicting claims among diﬀerent government oﬃces”).
307 See generally Aul, supra note 284.
302
303
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ways deﬁned by law and convention,308 but they are still organs of the
government of the United States. Criminal defendants with cases before the
Supreme Court are human beings, so the analogy goes only so far.
Whether it makes sense to change the ethics rules for the Defender
General turns, we think, on how one understands the Supreme Court as an
institution. If the Court is principally a court, allowing the Defender General
to represent an unwilling defendant borders on absurd. When a defendant
and the Defender General view a legal issue diﬀerently, the exclusive
Defender General model leaves the defendant voiceless, despite his enormous
stake in the proceedings. On the other hand, if the Court is principally a
lawmaking body that uses discrete cases and controversies only as the backdrop
for its policy judgments, the change makes much more sense. On that
understanding, what counts is the policy the Court makes, not what happens
to the particular case that provides the vehicle. Lower courts are available to
work out such details. The voice the Court needs to hear is the one focused
on policy—the Defender General’s.
In the end, while we certainly recognize that the Court is a lawmaking
body,309 it is also still a court. And allowing the Defender General to represent
unwilling defendants would likely strike many as too signiﬁcant a deviation
from settled norms about how courts function. Moreover, public legitimacy
is an important component of the Supreme Court’s ability to regulate
effectively.310 The spectacle of forcing defendants to be represented by an
attorney who doesn’t represent their interests—given how inconsistent that
would seem with ordinary intuitions about how a court system should
work—might make the Court’s decisions in the criminal sphere harder for
the public to accept.
We are also concerned that an exclusive Defender General model would
diminish the incentive for criminal defense lawyers at the trial and appellate
levels to preserve and develop potentially certiorari-worthy legal questions.
One—though of course not the exclusive—reason criminal lawyers are
attentive to such issues is that identifying one could lead to a Supreme Court
argument. If the Defender General (along with her assistants) get all of the
arguments, that incentive would disappear.

308 See generally Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
1163 (2013).
309 See supra Section I.A.
310 For a discussion of Supreme Court legitimacy, see Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How
to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148 (2019).
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B. State- and Lower-Court Involvement
Thus far, we have contemplated a Defender General’s Oﬃce that focuses
exclusively on the Supreme Court. Its purview could be expanded. The
Defender General could also participate as amicus in important cases pending
in lower federal courts or even in state courts.311 A great deal of criminal law
is obviously made and developed below the level of the Supreme Court.312
Indeed, on one account, federal appellate courts are “much more important
[than the Supreme Court] in setting and enforcing the law of the United
States.”313 By ﬁling amicus briefs and presenting arguments, the Defender
General could ensure that the views of defendants as a class are cogently
presented in lower court cases that appear likely to break new legal ground.314
The principal tradeoﬀ, as we see it, is resources. For the Defender General
to participate in lower court litigation, her Oﬃce would have to either
monitor a vast number of pending cases or develop a mechanism through
which participants in lower court litigation could alert it to unusually
important cases. And then of course briefs must be written and arguments
attended. That all takes personnel time. There is, moreover, less beneﬁt to
Defender General participation in lower court cases than in cases at the
Supreme Court, and not only because Supreme Court decisions have binding
national eﬀect. We’ve described the systematic inequality between the quality
of representation of defendants and the government in the Supreme Court.315
We currently have no way of knowing whether that inequality exists in the
lower federal courts or state courts, but even if it did, no amount of resources
would (or should) enable the Defender General to participate in more than a
tiny fraction of lower court cases. If there’s a gap in the quality of appellate
311 We do not envision that the Defender General would ordinarily appear as counsel for
particular defendants in lower federal or state appellate courts.
312 See generally Andrew Hessick, The Impact of Government Appellate Strategies on the
Development of Criminal Law, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 477 (2009).
313 FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 1-2 (2007).
314 The Defender General’s purview could be expanded beyond the Supreme Court in other
ways as well. One possibility—which we note but do not explore in detail—is that the Defender
General might advocate for pro-criminal defense positions in public and political forums. Such
a move would come with costs and benefits. On the costs side, if the Defender General came to
be seen as a political actor, that might undercut her credibility with the Justices. On the other
hand, because at least some public defender offices are (understandably) wary of attracting too
much political attention, a high-proﬁle Defender General might ﬁll a gap in the political discourse.
See, e.g., Stanley A. Goldman, Foreword: First Thing We Do, Let’s Kill All the (Defense) Lawyers, 30
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) (“When I suggested to my supervisor that the public defender’s oﬃce
was obviously not doing enough public relations to explain our job to the citizenry, I was informed
that the less the public knew about the job they were paying us to perform, the better oﬀ we would
be.”). We are grateful to Trevor Gardner for suggesting the potential expansion of the Defender
General’s mission.
315 See supra subsection I.B.2.
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lawyering outside the Supreme Court, the Defender General is not capable
of solving that problem.
Nonetheless, when lower court litigation raises important legal questions
implicating the interests of criminal defendants as a class, the Defender
General could further its mission by presenting its views. This would have
particular value in cases where the existing defense brieﬁng is weak. Judge
Carolyn King of the Fifth Circuit has noted that when she receives a
“mediocre or even poor” brief from a United States Attorney’s Oﬃce in an
important criminal case, she sometimes asks for a letter brief from the
Solicitor General setting forth the position of the United States (even though
the United States is already a party to the case).316 The Defender General
could play an analogous role in lower court litigation. When a lower federal
or state court confronts a criminal law question that it recognizes is
important, but for which the defense brieﬁng is not helpful, the Defender
General’s Oﬃce could be a convenient place for the court to turn.
State courts in particular suggest another possibility. In recent decades,
many states have created their own state solicitor general’s oﬃces to supervise
appellate litigation on behalf of the government.317 One study concluded that
these oﬃces improved states’ likelihood of success in cases before the
Supreme Court.318 If emulating the federal Solicitor General provides
beneﬁts for states, so could emulating a federal Defender General. One could
imagine oﬃces of state defenders general, charged with advocating for the
collective interests of state defendants in state court cases in which the federal
Defender General would lack the resources to participate.319
C. Alternative Solutions
We’ve made our best case for why the Defender General is needed.
Those not convinced by our proposal should answer a difficult question: if
not the Defender General, what should be done about the asymmetries
distorting the Court’s criminal decisionmaking? The most likely answer,
of course, is to do nothing and to maintain the status quo. This option is
The Rise of Appellate Litigators and State Solicitors General, supra note 147, at 677-78.
See Banks Miller, Describing the State Solicitors General, 93 JUDICATURE 238, 238 (2010)
(identifying this trend as having “beg[un] in earnest in the late 1980s”).
318 See Owens & Wohlfarth, supra note 137, at 659 (ﬁnding that “a state that uses a state OSG
attorney to litigate before the U.S. Supreme Court has a 0.24 greater [probability] of winning its
case than a similar state that does not use an OSG attorney”).
319 Given the diversity of state appellate court structures and existing statewide oﬃces
handling criminal appeals for indigent defendants, the value of such an office would vary substantially
by state. In some states, indigent defense at the appellate level is already consolidated into one office,
thus achieving some (but certainly not all) of the advantages of a defender general. See, e.g., IOWA
CODE § 814.11(2)(a) (2020) (directing indigent appointments to the state appellate defender).
316
317
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untenable; the stakes in criminal justice are high for individuals affected,
and there is no good reason to simply ignore a persistent regulatory
distortion. We see only two alternative reforms, which we consider in turn.
The first would be to “level down” the government by forcing it to litigate
more like an individual defendant. The second choice would be to try to shift
more power over criminal justice to an institution other than the Supreme
Court. Both options seem practically more difficult than creating an Office of
the Defender General.
1. Leveling Down
The idea behind the Defender General proposal is a form of “leveling up.”
The government has many advantages in criminal litigation at the Supreme
Court; the Defender General proposal seeks to give defendants some of the
advantages currently enjoyed exclusively by the government. But if
equalizing representation is the goal, another option is to “level down”—to
strip the government of its advantages, and make it litigate cases more like
individual defendants do.320
What would leveling down look like? One method would be to get the
Solicitor General’s Office out of the business of litigating criminal cases.
Imagine that appellate control over every federal prosecution remained in
the hands of the individual Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) who
had handled the case in the trial court. 321 That AUSA would decide
whether to appeal adverse rulings and whether to seek certiorari; she would
also take the lead on brieﬁng and argument if the Supreme Court agreed to
decide the case. Such a reform would address a number of the imbalances we
have identiﬁed.
First, in terms of the government’s ability to play for the rules, the AUSA
who prosecuted a defendant in the lower court would likely be personally and
emotionally invested in achieving a favorable outcome in a particular case,
and would thus be less willing to simply drop potential appeals with lessthan-optimal facts—even if doing so might be in the government’s longerterm interest. Second, while many AUSAs (just like many public defenders)
are excellent lawyers, we suspect that few are experts on the ﬁner details of
Supreme Court advocacy. Many would likely be arguing at the Court for the
320 Cf. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 787 (2011)
(distinguishing between leveling up and leveling down in the context of the Equal Protection Clause).
321 Each U.S. Attorney’s Oﬃce is supposed to designate one AUSA as a supervisor of that
oﬃce’s appellate matters. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 2-5.110 (2018),
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-2-5000-appellate-standards-us-attorneys-offices#2-5.110 [https://
perma.cc/7PRH-FSWL]. Not every oﬃce has a dedicated appellate specialist, however. See
McGaughey, supra note 72, at 310 (noting that appeal recommendation memoranda are prepared by
an “oﬃce’s appellate specialist, if there is one”).
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ﬁrst (and probably only) time in their careers. Thus, this solution would
ameliorate some of the existing advocacy gap between defendants and the
government. Third, because any individual AUSA would not appear at the
Court with any regularity, and because no particular U.S. Attorney’s oﬃce
would be likely to make frequent appearances before the Court,322 the
credibility gap between the two sides would likely be reduced.
This “solution” seems deeply unsatisfactory. For one, it would not fully
address the imbalance because a number of criminal cases are litigated by
states, not the federal government. And so meaningful leveling-down would
require some additional restructuring of how state governments handle appeals
in criminal cases—making this alternative proposal even more implausible.
The larger problem, though, is that the cure seems worse than the disease.
Leveling down would make the two sides in criminal litigation more evenly
matched, on average. But it would also clearly make the overall level of
advocacy at the Supreme Court worse, or at least much less consistent. That
change would, we fear, make Supreme Court decisionmaking more random
in individual cases, as the level of advocacy on each side would be somewhat
unpredictable from case to case. That randomness would, to be sure, beneﬁt
both sides of criminal litigation roughly evenly over time. But it would also
likely make the Court a less eﬀective regulator. The Court ﬁnds advocates
from the Solicitor General’s Oﬃce, like Michael Dreeben, credible because
they provide the Justices with useful information and intelligent arguments
that help them make better decisions.
We see no good reason to deprive the Court of that assistance. We care
about the asymmetry in Supreme Court litigation because it leads the Court
to produce substantively worse regulation—not because some balance of
advantage in criminal litigation is inherently desirable.323 The two sides in
322 There are some possible exceptions. The Southern District of New York, which is
particularly prominent in criminal prosecutions for ﬁnancial crimes, and the Eastern District of
Virginia, in which a number of high-proﬁle national security prosecutions take place, might make
more frequent appearances. See Sari Horwitz, In Va.’s Eastern District, U.S. Attorney’s Reach Transcends
Geographic Bounds, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/in-vas-eastern-district-us-attorneys-reach-transcends-geographic-bounds/2012/12/15/
a3f8f992-4625-11e2-9648-a2c323a991d6_story.html [https://perma.cc/2LER-5YWG]; Allan Smith,
‘We Know How to Do This Better Than Anybody’: Southern District of NY on the Job After Mueller Probe
Ends, NBC NEWS (March 25, 2019, 11:33 AM EDT), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donaldtrump/we-know-how-do-better-anybody-southern-district-ny-job-n978681 [https://perma.cc/
SMP3-CD54] (quoting a former AUSA in the Southern District of New York, describing that oﬃce
as “historically . . . very independent, . . . especially in the financial crimes spaces,” where the office
“made its name” (quotation marks omitted)). Still, we think these appearances would not be nearly
frequent enough to generate the institutional credibility currently enjoyed by the Solicitor General’s
Oﬃce.
323 For a fascinating discussion of attitudes towards the balance of power in criminal procedure,
see Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1441-42, 1456-58 (1985).
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criminal litigation “are not athletic teams, or separate branches of government
that we hope will keep each other in check.”324 In this context, equality
between the two sides is an instrumental tool, not the ultimate goal. It would
be foolish to make the Court’s decisionmaking worse simply to make sure
neither side has an advantage.
2. Regulatory Alternatives
If leveling down is not a good solution, the only other alternative would
be to try to transfer power over criminal justice regulation to some new or
diﬀerent institution that isn’t the Supreme Court. Perhaps the problem is just
with the use of litigation as the mechanism for regulatory rulemaking in the
criminal arena. One can imagine legislatures taking on a larger role for
regulating criminal justice. More adventurously, imagine (and bracket for
now all federalism problems involved in this exercise) that some new federal
agency or commission was put in charge of regulating some of the things
currently under the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction—like the basic rules
governing police practices. Perhaps such an agency, if well designed, could
make rules without the distorting eﬀect inevitably caused by adjudicating
individual cases.
Perhaps—but it is important to “avoid comparing a model of case-based
lawmaking that recognizes its ﬂaws and limitations with an idealized model
of . . . rulemaking that refuses to recognize the limitations of that process.”325
As Neil Komesar puts it, when selecting among diﬀerent institutions “[t]he
choice is always a choice among highly imperfect alternatives.”326 Here, the
critical point is that there is no reason to think there is a plausible criminal
justice regulator that would be immune from the pro-government distortions
that aﬄict the Supreme Court’s process.
Consider legislatures ﬁrst. As noted at the outset, the conventional
wisdom is that the Court is the right institution to regulate criminal justice
precisely because legislatures tend to be so hostile to defendants’ interests.327
And indeed, there are a number of arguments for why legislatures are likely
to be particularly friendly to law-enforcement interests. That may be what
voters want, because voters are more likely to identify with victims of crime
than with those accused of crime.328 The way that power over criminal justice
324 David Alan Sklansky, Two More Ways Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 236-37 (2015). Sklansky’s remark was about the balance of power between
police and criminals, but it is equally apt here.
325 Schauer, supra note 59, at 912.
326 KOMESAR, supra note 39, at 5.
327 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
328 See Dripps, supra note 1, at 1093 (“The class of people at risk from [decisions not to arrest
or convict individuals who are in fact guilty] is very large, and quite sensibly frightened about crime.
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is shared between legislatures and prosecutors may create asymmetrical
political incentives for legislators to pass tough-on-crime laws.329 And lawenforcement interests are highly eﬀective at lobbying legislatures for their
preferred reforms, whereas those subject to criminal law are much less
equipped to organize in order to protect their interest in the legislative
arena.330 Indeed, criminal suspects and defendants fare relatively poorly in
the legislative process vis-à-vis the government for the same reasons that they
fare less well in the judicial process—the government can present a uniﬁed
front, whereas individual suspects and defendants are poorly equipped to
band together and protect their interests.
Nor do agencies necessarily fare better than courts. That’s because prolaw-enforcement interests are likely to be highly eﬀective at inﬂuencing any
regulatory body. Consider the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Although
intended to be an insulated, independent body of experts, the Commission
has at times become largely beholden to the interests of federal prosecutors.331
Law-enforcement interests can thus “capture” a criminal justice regulatory
agency in the same way that a regulated industry can capture a more
traditional agency. Preventing such capture in criminal justice agencies would
be a challenging task. Even if it is possible, and even if shifting the locus of
criminal justice regulation from courts to agencies would be otherwise
desirable, it would take a fundamental reworking of our institutions. Yet we
need better national criminal justice policy in the here and now. For better or
worse, that will come (or not) from the Court. Creating an Office of the
Defender General is a relatively simple and practical reform that could improve
the Court’s criminal justice policymaking process immediately.
CONCLUSION
The list of broken institutions and harmful practices in American criminal
justice is long—mass incarceration, police violence, coercive plea bargaining,
and racially disparate policing and prosecution, to name a few. Each of these
problems, and many more, impact the lives of thousands or millions of
Their interests are supported by a professional class with a very intense interest in the outcome of
legislative decisions regarding criminal justice.”).
329 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 50910 (2001) (discussing how voters’ demand for harsh treatment of criminals and the benefit of cooperation
between prosecutors and legislators encourages an alliance that leads to broader liability rules and
harsher sentences).
330 For a discussion of interest-group dynamics within sentencing commissions, see Rachel E.
Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 723-30 (2005).
331 See id. at 758-65 (explaining that the membership-selection features of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, in conjunction with other incentives, have led it to often be “heavily tilted toward law
enforcement” and prosecution interests).
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Americans, year in and year out. What are the technical details of litigation
in the Supreme Court next to problems of their magnitudes?
Yet for better or worse, the Supreme Court’s rulings aﬀect the pathologies
of criminal justice. They may not be their root cause, but sometimes—too
often—they exacerbate them. Those concerned with reform of criminal
justice—as we are—should worry about the Court. Speciﬁcally, they should
worry about ways in which the details of Supreme Court litigation
disadvantage criminal defendants. The asymmetric representation we have
described is a signiﬁcant example, and a real problem. It’s also, as we’ve
shown, a ﬁxable one. The Defender General is an idea whose time has come.

